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ADJUDICATING NON-JUSTICIABLE RIGHTS: 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
Eric C. Christiansen* 
We live in a society in which there are great 
disparities in wealth. Millions of people are living in 
deplorable conditions in great poverty . ... These 
conditions already existed when the Constitution was 
adopted and a commitment to address them, and 
transform our society into one in which there will be 
human dignity, freedom and equality, lies at the heart 
of our new constitutional order. I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It has historically been argued and traditionally accepted 
that socio-economic rights are non-justiciable. Advocates of this 
position have asserted that, while rights to housing, health care, 
education, and other forms of social welfare may have value as moral 
• Associate Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law, San 
Francisco, California; J.D., New York University School of Law, 2001; M.A., 
University of Chicago, 1994. In writing this Article I was fortunate to draw upon 
my experiences as a 2001 foreign law clerk to Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson of 
the South African Constitutional Court. I also benefited from helpful comments 
from my GGU colleagues Michele Benedetto, David Oppenheimer, and Rachel 
Van Cleave, and received valuable aid from my research assistants, Justin Ngo 
and Rory Quintana. Particular gratitude is also due to Chester Chuang for his 
insightful critiques and to Andrew Moores-Grimshaw for his enduring support. 
The opinions expressed and any errors are my own. 
1. Thiagraj Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 
765 (CC) para. 8 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter Soobramoneyl. This and all South African 
Constitutional Court cases are available online at the Court's official website, 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za. 
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statements of a nation's ideals, they should not be viewed as a legal 
declaration of enforceable rights. Adjudication of such rights requires 
an assessment of fundamental social values that can only be carried 
out legitimately by the political branches of government, and the 
proper enforcement of socio-economic rights requires significant 
government resources that can only be adequately assessed and 
balanced by the legislature. Judges and courts, according to this 
argument, lack the political legitimacy and institutional competence 
to decide such matters. 
Nevertheless, a steadily increasing number of countries have 
chosen to include socio-economic rights in their constitutions-with 
varying (and sometimes unclear) levels of enforcement.2 At the core 
of such "social rights" are rights to adequate housing, health care, 
food, water, social security, and education.3 Each of these rights is 
enumerated in the 1996 South African Constitution.4 Moreover, most 
2. Inclusion of piecemeal social rights, such as the right to education only, 
or of comprehensive but non-justiciable rights remains the norm. See Mary Ann 
Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519, 527-
28 (1992); see also Wojciech Sadurski, Post-Communist Charters of Rights in 
Europe and the U.S. Bill of Rights, 65 Law & Contemp. Probs. 223 (2002). South 
Africa is exceptional for its comprehensive list of enumerated, enforceable social 
rights. See Eric C. Christiansen, Survey of Socio-economic Rights in National 
Constitutions: Healthcare, Education, Social Security, Housing, Food and Water 
(December 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); accord Sandra 
Liebenberg, South Africa's Evolving Jurisprudence on Socio-Economic Rights, 6 
Law Democracy & Dev. 159 (2002), available at 
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/Projects/Socio-EconomicRightsiresearch/ 
socio-economic-rights_ jurisprudence/evolvingjurisprudence. pdf. 
3. There is no set list of which rights are properly defined as "socio-
economic" rights. Rather than attempting to create a new orthodoxy regarding 
the contents of such a list, I am including those rights in the South African 
Constitution that are traditionally and consistently identified as socio-economic 
rights by commentators, have been so identified by the South African 
Constitutional Court, and have as their evident purpose the improvement of 
society through an impact on individuals' social welfare. Similarly, I use the 
terms "social" and "socio-economic" to describe the same collection of rights; I 
have avoided "red" rights, "second-generation" rights, and "positive" rights 
(except when explained in the text) as they are less helpful descriptors for the 
same rights. 
4. S. Afr. Const. 1996. For the full text of these rights provisions, see infra 
Part II.B.3.b. Other socio-economic rights can be found in the South African 
Constitution in ch. 2, §§ 23 (labor relations), 25 (property rights and land reform), 
28 (children's rights to, inter alia, "basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care 
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of them have been the subject of full judicial proceedings before the 
South Mrican Constitutional Court.5 This makes the South Mrican 
situation unparalleled in international constitutional jurisprudence. 
Although some other countries' constitutions enumerate socio-
economic rights, few countries' courts have found such rights to be 
fully and directly justiciable, and even fewer have multiple, 
affirmative social rights opinions. No other country has developed 
their case law sufficiently to outline a comprehensive jurisprudence. 
As a consequence, South Mrica's role in the social rights 
adjudication debate is seen as revolutionary and heroic by 
proponents of justiciability and as irresponsible and doomed by its 
detractors. Now, as the first generation of justices leaves the Court,6 
sufficient judgments exist to articulate a novel but coherent 
jurisprudence. What is revealed is a Court that has been both less 
revolutionary and less irresponsible than commentators expected 
(and continue to allege). This is because the Court's jurisprudence 
has incorporated the concerns of the jurists who argue that courts 
lack the legitimacy and competence to decide such matters, even 
services and social services"), and 35 (detainees' rights to, inter alia, "adequate 
accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment"). 
5. The South Mrican judicial system permits constitutional review of social 
rights (as with all rights) by lower courts (trial-level High Courts and the 
appellate-level Supreme Court of Appeal) as well. As a consequence, social rights 
rulings have also been issued by the High Courts (trial courts found in each 
province) and the Supreme Court of Appeal (an intermediate appellate court for 
constitutional issues and final review court for non-constitutional issues). I am 
not considering those judgments, except where noted, because the Constitutional 
Court has the capacity to review all such decisions and has altered the lower 
courts' orders and presented its own reasoning in each such case. See S. Afr. 
Const. 1996; see also discussion infra Part IV.B. Moreover, this paper seeks to 
elucidate and evaluate the comprehensive jurisprudence issuing from the Court 
rather than to merely poll the various, and sometimes divergent, rulings of all 
South African courts. For a review of these lower court judgments related to 
socio-economic rights, see the Socio-Economic Rights Project of the Community 
Law Centre's Case Reviews, http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/ 
ProjectslSocio-Economic-Rights/case-reviews-1 (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) 
[hereinafter SERP's Case Reviewsl. 
6. See Const. Ct. of S. Afr., http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za (official 
website) (follow "Judges" hyperlink). Currently five of the eleven justices 
appointed in October 1994--Langa, Madala, Mokgoro, O'Regan, and Sachs-
remain on the court. Newly appointed justices are appointed for non-renewable 
terms of 12 to 15 years depending on the age of the Justice at the time of 
appointment. S. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 8, § 176. 
324 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LA W REVIEW [38:321 
while the Court is performing the affirmative review and remediation 
functions desired by the jurists who favor judicial enforcement of 
social rights. The Court maintains an affirmative social rights 
jurisprudence tempered by internalized justiciability concerns. 
This paper begins with an examination of social rights in the 
South Mrican constitutional drafting process. Following a review of 
the traditional arguments against the justiciability of socio-economic 
rights, it then examines the South African Constitutional Court cases 
addressing social rights, focusing on four primary cases: the 
antecedent case Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: 
In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
19967 and three substantive social rights cases, Thiagraj 
Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal,8 Government of 
Republic of South Africa v Irene Grootboom and Others,9 and 
Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No.2) (TAC).IO 
This Article then constructs a South African jurisprudence related to 
socio-economic rights and highlights its distinctive characteristics. 
The final part of this paper demonstrates why the Court's 
jurisprudence is best understood as a viable, affirmative 
jurisprudence of social rights that is typified by a series of internal, 
self-imposed limitations shaped by the theoretical arguments against 
the justiciability of such rights. 
II. SOCIO-EcONOMIC RIGHTS IN A POST-APARTHEID CONSTITUTION 
Although the South African constitutional drafting process 
involved significant struggle, it ultimately achieved a goal considered 
impossible for decades: a relatively non-violent transition from 
7. Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) paras. 1-
19, 76-78 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter In re: Certification of the South African 
Constitution l. 
8. Soobramoney, supra note 1. 
9. Government of Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 
(CC) para. 2 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter Grootbooml. 
10. Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No.2) 2002 (5) SA 721 
(CC) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter TAC]. There were four similarly titled cases in the 
South African Constitutional Court because of direct applications and 
interlocutory appeals. This citation is to the final judgment. 
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"racial autocracy to a non-racial democracy, by means of a negotiated 
transition, the progressive implementation of democracy, and respect 
for fundamental human rights." 1 1 Because of unique elements of the 
drafting process, the Constitutional Court played a decisive role in 
assuring the success of the South African transition to democracy 
and in finalizing the Constitutional text. One fundamental 
disagreement that arose in the drafting process-a conflict 
eventually settled by the Court itself in its Certification opinion-
involved whether or not socio-economic rights were permissibly 
included in the Constitution as justiciable rights enforceable by 
courts. 12 
A. Drafting a New Constitution for a Democratic South 
Africa 
In December 1991, delegates of South Africa's various 
political parties gathered at Johannesburg's World Trade Centre for 
constitutional negotiations at a forum called the Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa (CODESA).13 Disagreement about the 
process for drafting the constitution formed an initial, core conflict 
between the dominant negotiating parties preceding any 
conversations about particular constitutional provisions. Was the 
purpose of CODESA merely to create a workable transition structure 
that would facilitate democratic elections and thereby enable a 
popularly elected body to draft the Constitution, or were the party-
appointed CODESA delegates empowered to write the entire 
constitution? This question was about far more than democratic 
constitutive theory; the opposing positions represented the 
11. Albie Sachs, Constitutional Developments in South Africa, 28 N.Y.U. J. 
Int'l L. & Pol. 695, 695 (1996); accord African National Congress (ANC), 
Mzabalazo: A Brief History of the African National Congress, 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocsiabout/umzabalazo.html (last visited Jan. 13,2007). 
12. In re: Certification of the South African Constitution, supra note 7, 
paras. 1-19,76-78. 
13. The total work of the CODESA (and its follow-up negotiations, the 
Multi-Party Negotiating Process) was carried out by five Working Groups. The 
bulk of the Bill of Rights determinations and the procedural details of the 
constitutional process-and the vast majority of the most divisive issues-came 
out of Working Group Two. Other Groups addressed different aspects of the 
transition to democracy. See Lourens du Plessis & Hugh Corder, Understanding 
South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights 4-6 (1994). 
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fundamental strategic goals of the National Party (NP), representing 
the white-minority apartheid government, versus the Mrican 
National Congress (ANC), the popular and newly unbanned anti-
apartheid party. The ANC wanted the smallest possible mandate for 
CODESA so that the constitution would be drafted by a new, sure-to-
be ANC-dominated popular legislature. The NP wanted CODESA to 
write an entire constitution that would protect the white minority 
through codification of individual and group rights, protection from 
prosecution for apartheid-era actions, and clauses preserving the 
economic status quo. 14 
The solution to this core, procedural conflict was a two-stage 
constitutional drafting process with a newly-formed constitutional 
court enforcing the parties' negotiated agreement. IS The first stage 
involved drafting a preliminary constitution (the 1993 Interim 
Constitution), holding fully democratic elections, and setting up a 
new Parliament that would choose a new president. The second stage 
gave the task of crafting the final constitution (the 1996 
Constitution)16 to the newly elected Parliament and Senate in their 
role as the Constitutional Assembly. Two safeguards linked the two 
stages of the process: a set of thirty-four inviolable constitutional 
principles (known as the Thirty-four Principles) established by the 
initial negotiating parties to constrict the subsequent, final 
constitution l ? and a constitutional court appointed under the Interim 
Constitution with the task of certifying that the final Constitution 
14. See generally Allister Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country: The 
Inside Story of South Africa's Road to Change (1995); Patti Waldmeir, Anatomy of 
a Miracle (1997) (both books providing general histories of the political 
transformation of South Africa at the end ofthe apartheid era). 
15. The basic structure of this plan was originally proposed by Nelson 
Mandela one year prior to the start of CODESA, tacitly approved by President de 
Klerk at CODESA's inaugural session, and formalized over the course of 
CODESA. Waldmeir, supra note 14, at 194-95. 
16. It is, of course, a bit of a misnomer to refer to the 1996 Constitution as 
the final constitution. The designation "final" refers not to its projected 
permanence but to its place at the end and as capstone of the transition from 
apartheid to multi-racial democracy. The Constitution has been amended twelve 
times since its completion in December 1996. Amendments are listed and noted 
in text on the website for the Constitutional Court of South Africa, 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/theconstitution/thetext.htm 
(last visited Jan. 13, 2007). 
17. S. Afr. (Interim) Const. 1993, sched. 4. 
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did not violate any of the thoroughly negotiated Thirty-four 
Principles. IS The Thirty-four Principles guided-or obstructed, 
depending on one's perspective-the drafting process for the final 
Constitution and the resultant current form of government in South 
Africa. 
Altogether, nearly two years passed between the start of 
formal constitutional negotiations at CODESA and the approval of 
the Interim Constitution and the Thirty-four Principles by the party 
delegates late in the evening on November 17, 1993. 19 The provisions 
of the Interim Constitution, including establishment of the 
Constitutional Court, came into effect on the first day of South 
Mrica's first multiracial elections, April 26, 1994.20 
The Constitutional Assembly, comprised of the 400 newly-
elected members of the National Assembly and the ninety members 
of the Senate, began working on the text of the final Constitution in 
May 1994. Under the Interim Constitution, the constitutive body was 
given two years from its first post-election meeting to complete its 
task.21 The text ofthe proposed final Constitution was adopted by an 
overwhelming majority in both houses of Parliament-eighty of 
ninety Senators and 321 of 400 National Assembly members, 
significantly above the required two-thirds majority of the entire 490-
member body.22 However, the final Constitution could not be signed 
by the President or come into force unless and until the 
18. Albie Sachs, South Africa's Unconstitutional Constitution, 41 St. Louis 
U. L.J. 1249, 1255 (1997). 
19. Du Plessis & Corder, supra note 13, at 2-17. 
20. South Africa's democratic elections were held over several days 
beginning on April 26, 1994. Despite serious allegations of fraud and ballot 
tampering, the results (outside KwaZulu-Natal) conformed with expectations to a 
significant degree: the ANC received a strong but not overly dominant 62.7%, the 
NP received a disappointing 20.4%, the Zulu-nationalist Inkatha Freedom Party 
won the KwaZulu-Natal Province, and the extremist parties on both the left and 
right received only marginal percentages. Election '94 South Africa: The 
Campaign, Results and Future Prospects 187 (Andrew Reynolds et al. eds., 1994). 
21. S. Afr. (Interim) Const. 1993, ch. 5, § 73. 
22. 3 Debates of the Constitutional Assembly, Rep. ofS. Afr. 447-50 (1996) 
[hereinafter Debates of the Constitutional Assembly]. Only one party, the African 
Christian Democratic Party, voted against the text (with two votes). The Freedom 
Front, a white right-wing party, abstained from the vote with 13 votes. [d. 
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Constitutional Court "certified" it, confirming there were no conflicts 
between the Thirty-four Principles and the draft final Constitution.23 
B. Socio-Economic Rights in the Drafting Process 
1. Socio-Economic Apartheid 
Inaugurated in 1948 by the Mrikaner-dominated National 
Party, apartheid, or "separateness," developed into a comprehensive 
political philosophy and social policy that sought to formally separate 
the legally defined races in all areas of social, economic, and political 
life. Apartheid expanded upon earlier segregation policies by 
criminalizing a wide variety of human activities and denying the 
rights and harshly restricting the freedoms of all non-white South 
Mricans. As they evolved and expanded throughout the 1960s and 
1970s, apartheid laws impacted nearly every aspect of people's lives, 
and apartheid definitions of race circumscribed their rights, 
opportunities, and relationships with others and the state. Apartheid 
dictated a policy of separation with only the merest pretence of 
equality, theoretically guided by the development needs of the 
"inferior races" but in fact effecting a tremendous socio-economic 
advantage for whites, especially Mrikaners.24 The crushing impact of 
apartheid on non-whites had always been experienced in the social 
and economic elements of South Africans' lives as well as the 
politica1.25 As Kader Asmal, CODESA negotiator and member of the 
Constitutional Assembly for the ANC described it: 
The struggle for liberation in South Mrica was not only a 
struggle for the right to vote, to move, to marry or to love. It 
has always been a struggle for freedom from hunger, 
poverty, landlessness, and homelessness. Our Bill of Rights 
therefore must reflect ... the multidimensional and all-
encompassing nature ofthe struggle for liberation.26 
Although precise information about the South African 
economy is either unavailable or unreliable for the waning years of 
23. In re: Certification of the South African Constitution, supra note 7, 
paras. 1-19, 26-31. 
24. See Frank Welsh, A History of South Africa 414-99 (2000). 
25. See The Post-Apartheid Constitutions: Perspective on South Africa's 
Basic Law 408-09 (Penelope Andrews et al. eds., 2001). 
26. 3 Debates ofthe Constitutional Assembly, supra note 22, at 122-23. 
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apartheid and the subsequent transition to democracy, it was 
unquestionably "among the world's most unequal economies.,,27 And, 
the inequity closely traced apartheid's racial divide: the standard of 
living for whites was nearly on par with residents of Norway or 
Sweden while black South Africans had a standard of living below 
that of residents of Ghana or Kenya.28 This desperate socio-economic 
situation existed prior to and during the constitutional transition 
period and directly impacted the process.29 
2. Negotiating the Interim Constitution 
Because political and socio-economic oppression were 
fundamentally intertwined throughout the anti-apartheid struggle, 
the ANC's commitment to the transformation of the socio-economic 
27. Julian May, Talking to the Finance Minister about Poverty: Pro-Poor 
Policy and the Political Economy of Information 10, paper prepared for the 
International Conference on Staying Poor, University of Manchester (April 7-9, 
2003), 'available at http://www.chronicpoverty.org/pdfs/2003conferencepapersJ 
May.pdf (citing the World Bank's description of South Africa's economic 
inequality). 
28. Id. at 9 (based on United Nations Development Programme data from 
2001). Statistics for all individual aspects of the South African economy track 
such discrepancies during the transitional period. While just one percent of 
whites fell below the national poverty line, over 60% of blacks did. Id. 65% of 
whites had completed secondary education compared to 24% of blacks-and 24% 
of blacks had no formal schooling (compared to one percent of whites) at the time 
of the transition. A.J. Christopher, Atlas of Changing South Africa 233 (2000). 
Although President Thabo Mbeki reported, in his 2006 State of the Nation 
address, that there had been a 60% increase in real social expenditure per person 
between 1983 and 2003, the stark socio-economic legacy of apartheid will haunt 
South Mrica for many decades more. See SouthAfrica.Info, The Poor Must Also 
Benefit: Mbeki (Feb. 6, 2006), http://www.southafrica.info/ess_info/ 
sa~lance/social_delivery/stateofnation2006-social.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 
2007). 
Significant progress has been made but enormous improvement is still 
required to overcome the dramatic inequalities of apartheid. The housing 
situation illustrates the continuing challenge: even though 1.46 million 
subsidized houses were built in the decade prior to 2004, 36% of households still 
do not reside in formal housing. See Gov't Commc'n and Info. Sys., Rep. of S. Afr., 
Toward 10 Years of Freedom: Progress in the First Decade, Challenges in the 
Second 2 (2004), available at http://www.gcis.gov.zaldocsJpublicationsJ10tab.pdf 
[hereinafter Toward 10 Years of Freedom]. Similar statistics are available for 
other socio-economic indicators. [d. 
29. Soobramoney, supra note 1, para. 8. 
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lives of South Africans can be traced back throughout its history; 
socio-economic equality was inextricably linked to political 
emancipation in the ANC's vision of a post-apartheid South Mrica.30 
For the National Party, apartheid was a system of socio-economic 
benefits (not just political control) and their negotiating position 
sought to maintain the beneficial status quo through exclusion of 
justiciable socio-economic rights. These strongly opposed viewpoints 
regarding one of "the most contentious questions in the South 
Mrican constitutional debate" typified the gulf to be bridged in 
crafting the post-apartheid constitution.31 
a. The ANC Position 
As a consequence of its history, the inclusion of social and 
economic rights in the new constitution was a near-requirement for 
the ANC. The party leadership and the general population saw no 
separation between the political and the socio-economic restrictions 
that were the overwhelmingly harsh reality of apartheid for most 
South Mricans. As one ANC leader stated in the debates on the final 
1996 Constitution, "Our people did not give their lives in exchange 
for the mere freedom to walk the streets ... nor to suffer continued 
deprivation while the architects of the old rules live in 
I d "32 sp en or .... 
These principles took on a new formality and greater 
consequence with the drafting of the strongly socialist Freedom 
Charter.33 The Freedom Charter, a statement of political principles 
30. See Kader Asmal, The Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture for 2004 (July 
9, 2004), http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/speeches/2004/sp0709.html (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2007) (Asmal, a leading ANC figure, discussing the background of the 
ANC's struggle against apartheid). 
31. Etiene Mureinik, Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the 
Constitution, 8 S. Afr. J. on Hum. Rts. 464, 465 (1992). 
32. Const. Assembl., Rep. of S. Afr., The Constitutional Assembly: Annual 
Report 1996 (1996), available at http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/ 
constitutionlca/ANREPORT/Ca95_96.pdf (quoting Kader Asmal from open debate 
in Constitutional Assembly). 
33. Freedom Charter, Congress of the People, June 26, 1955, African 
National Congress Historical Document Archive, http://www.anc.org.za/ 
ancdocs/history/charter.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Freedom 
Charter]. It is controversial to describe the Freedom Charter as strongly socialist. 
Although the Charter declared that the "national wealth of our country ... shall 
be restored to the people; [t]he mineral wealth beneath the soil, the Banks and 
monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole; 
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by South Mricans opposed to apartheid, was popularly ratified at the 
Congress of the People in Kliptown, near Johannesburg, on June 26, 
1955.34 The Freedom Charter called for a multiracial, democratically 
elected government in South Mrica with equal opportunities for all. 
On socio-economic topics, the Freedom Charter declared: 
Education shall be free, compulsory, universal and equal 
for all children .... 
All people shall have the right to ... be decently housed, 
and to bring up their families in comfort and security . . . 
[Nlo-one shall go hungry; [andl Free medical care and 
hospitalisation shall be provided for all, with special care 
for mothers and young children .... 35 
Though not a formal ANC document, the Freedom Charter 
represented the guiding philosophical expression of the anti-
apartheid movement generally, and the ANC specifically, over the 
ensuing decades. It was the precursor to some of the ANC's most 
important constitutional documents: the 1988 Constitutional 
Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa;36 Ready to Govern In 
1992;37 and the draft Bills of Rights produced beginning in 1990.38 
[andl [alll other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the wellbeing of 
the people," its socialist tendencies have, at various times or for different 
audiences, been exaggerated or downplayed. 
34. The Congress of the People was composed of members of various anti-
apartheid groups including the African National Congress, the South African 
Indian Congress, the South African Congress of Democrats, and the Coloured 
People's Congress. The Freedom Charter was later adopted independently by all 
four organizations. [d. 
35. Freedom Charter, supra note 33; see also ANC, Africans' Claims in 
South Mrica, Bill of Rights (1943), available at http://www.anc.org.za/ 
ancdocslhistory/claims.html (strongly urging "the establishment of free medical 
and health services for all sections of the population" and demanding 
"[rlecognition of the sanctity or inviolability of the home as the right of every 
family ... [andl the right of every child to free and compulsory education"). 
36. ANC, Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa (1988), 
reprinted in 21 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 235 (1989) [hereinafter Constitutional 
Guidelines]. 
37. ANC, Ready to Govern: ANC policy guidelines for a democratic South 
Africa adopted at the National Conference (1992), available at 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/readyto.html [hereinafter Ready to 
Governl. 
38. ANC, Building a United Nation: ANC Policy Proposals for Final 
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The Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa 
were drafted by the ANC Constitutional Committee and made public 
as the possibility of a negotiated end to apartheid, with an unbanned 
ANC playing a major role, began to seem promising. It was a pithy 
working document of ANC constitutional policy that directly 
referenced the Freedom Charter: "The Constitution shall include a 
Bill of Rights based on the Freedom Charter .... The state and all 
social institutions shall be under a constitutional duty to take active 
steps to eradicate, speedily, the economic and social inequalities 
produced by racial discrimination."39 
In 1992, the ANC produced Ready to Govern, which 
expounded their guidelines for the constitution to be drafted at 
CODESA.40 Where the Constitutional Guidelines affirmed the ANC's 
commitment to the values of the Freedom Charter, Ready to Govern 
demonstrated a more mature application of those values to the larger 
project of constitution-making within the South African context. The 
more developed and sophisticated policies of Ready to Govern grew 
out of the years of intense domestic debate generally, and significant 
internal ANC discussions specifically. Ready to Govern identifies the 
ANC's clear intention to include affirmative provisions related to 
socio-economic rights: 
The Bill of Rights will affirm the right of all persons to 
have access to basic educational, health and welfare 
services. It will establish principles and mechanisms to 
ensure that there is an enforceable and expanding 
minimum floor of entitlements for all, in the areas of 
education, health and 
welfare. It will commit the courts to take into account the 
need to reduce malnutrition, unemployment and 
homelessness when making any decisions .... 
Special agencies linked to Parliament and the courts 
should be set up so as to ensure that national, regional and 
local authorities apply appropriate shares of their budgets 
to achieving these rights, taking into account the problems 
oflimited resources and affordability.41 
Constitution (1995), available at http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/ 
building.html [hereinafter Building a United Nation). 
39. Constitutional Guidelines, supra note 36, at 237. 
40. Ready to Govern, supra note 37. 
41. Id. 
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The subsequently proposed draft Bills of Rights adhered to these 
principles and were advanced by the ANC's negotiators for inclusion 
in the Interim Constitution. 
b. The National Party / Government Position 
For the ruling National Party, the traditional arguments 
against the justiciability of socio-economic rights and realpolitik 
arguments about the South African economy formed the core of their 
opposition to the inclusion of socio-economic rights. Claiming to 
represent economic realism in the face of populist pressures, the NP 
leader Frederik Willem de Klerk argued "only if economic security 
can be maintained together with political security will we have the 
stability which is necessary to build a new South Africa. »42 But 
behind such assertions, what the NP truly feared was a dramatic 
change in the economic status quO.43 Even more dramatically than it 
harmed all non-white South Africans, the system of apartheid had 
preserved socio-economic privilege for white South Africans, 
especially Afrikaners.44 Rights that might alter the distribution of 
domestic wealth were a direct threat. 
The NP's constitutional policies, expressed in its Proposals 
for a Charter of Fundamental Rights, advanced traditional 
libertarian doctrine in allowing only negative enforcement of rights 
against the state.45 As proposed by the NP, the Constitution would 
only allow claims to restrict government action, and only when such 
action interfered with the rights of individuals. The Bill of Rights 
would not recognize any affirmative claims upon the state to care for 
its citizens or to provide social welfare benefits. The NP Bill of Rights 
would have precluded any significant challenges to the status quo 
and was thus in direct opposition to the transformational social 
philosophy of the ANC. Indeed, the NP proposals even conflicted with 
the quasi-governmental South African Law Commission, which 
42. Robert Henderson, De Klerk and "Law and Order" in South Africa, 
Commentary No. 5 (Aug. 1990) (an unclassified publication of the Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service), available at http;llwww.csis-scrs.gc.caleni 
publications/commentary/com05.asp. 
43. Du Plessis & Corder, supra note 13, at 32. 
44. Welsh, supra note 24, at 463-99. 
45. Du Plessis & Corder, supra note 13, at 32-33. It is, of course, a great 
irony that the most heavily interventionist of governments had an eleventh-hour 
conversion to "hands-off' government (on the eve of its loss of power). 
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proposed an approach to social rights based on "directive 
principles.'>46 But even "directive principles," constitutional 
statements about budgeting priorities that are legally 
unenforceable,47 went too far for the NP. Ultimately, the only social 
right the NP proposed in its draft Bill of Rights was a qualified right 
to primary education-and this was motivated by the NP's insistence 
on Mrikaans-based education rather than by concern for substantive 
equality.48 If the NP had prevailed, the socio-economic legacy of 
apartheid would not have been addressed by the Constitution. 
Further, if the newly democratic government had attempted to 
remedy the economic legacy of apartheid, the Bill of Rights would 
have actually protected individuals against such government action. 
c. Interim Constitution 
The Interim Constitution was initially intended to be a mere 
framework document, sufficient for the period leading up to South 
Mrica's first democratic elections and for governing the country 
during the drafting of the final Constitution, but otherwise limited.49 
An expansive list of civil and political rights but few social rights 
were included in the Interim Constitution. 50 Furthermore, social 
rights were not expressly mentioned in the Thirty-four Principles 
that would guide the drafting of the final Constitution.51 The Interim 
46. Id. at 26-29. 
47. See, e.g., India Const. arts. 36-51 ["Directive Principles of State Policy"] 
(Article 37 states: "The provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable 
by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental 
in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply 
these principles in making laws."); Ir. Const., 1937, art. 45 ["Directive Principles 
of Social Policy"] ("The principles of social policy set forth in this Article are 
intended for the general guidance of the Oireachtas [Irish legislature]. The 
application of those principles in the making of laws shall be the care of the 
Oireachtas exclusively, and shall not be cognisable by any Court under any of the 
provisions of this Constitution."); and Namib. Const. arts. 95-101 ["Principles of 
State Policy"] (Article 101: "The principles of state policy contained in this 
Chapter shall not of and by themselves be legally enforceable by any Court, but 
shall nevertheless guide the Government in making and applying laws to give 
effect to the fundamental objectives ofthe said principles.") 
48. Du Plessis & Corder, supra note 13, at 32-33. 
49. S. Afr. (Interim) Const. 1993. 
50. Id. ch. 3. 
51. Id. sched. 4. 
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Constitution guaranteed only the right to basic education52 and, for 
children, the rights to "security, basic nutrition and basic health and 
social services.,,53 It also stated that the "right freely to engage in 
economic activity and to pursue a livelihood" did not "preclude 
measures designed to promote the protection or the improvement of 
the quality of life ... human development [and] social justice.,,54 In 
addition, the Interim Constitution required basic nutrition and 
medical care for prisoners.55 
In part, this dearth of social rights is attributable to the 
strength of the NP's negotiating position in the initial stage of the 
constitutional drafting process. Also, as the negotiating parties 
neared the end of the period for completing the Interim Constitution, 
final settlement of several issues was simply postponed in order to 
get the document finished and to hold the long-delayed democratic 
elections. 56 Moreover, in order to speed its implementation, the ANC 
sacrificed some of the party's goals for the Interim Constitution. 57 As 
a result, the divisive issue of socio-economic rights remained 
unsettled when the Constitutional Assembly gathered to draft the 
final Constitution. 
52. Id. § 30(a). 
53. Id. § 30(c). 
54. Id. § 26. 
55. Id. § 25(b). 
56. 1 Debates of the Constitutional Assembly, supra note 22, at 80-81 
(statement of Abdul Asmal, Member, ANC) ("[T]he controversial issues which we 
skirted ... have to be looked at here ... because we have to look at the issues 
that were not fully dealt with ... [including] economic and social rights, because 
we cannot make promises of liberal and democratic rights without a full 
familiarity with economic and social rights .... "). 
57. Du Plessis & Corder, supra note 13, ch. 1; see also Hassen Ebrahim, 
Soul of a Nation: Constitution-Making in South Africa 165-72 (Oxford University 
Press 1998). Other niceties were sacrificed in finalizing the Interim Constitution, 
a document described by one drafter as "sloppy, untidy, unstructured, obscure in 
many places and without ... stylistic coherence .... [I]t is like South Africa ... 
large, unwieldy and uncontrollable . . . ." 1 Debates of the Constitutional 
Assembly, supra note 22, at 78 (statement of Abdul Asmal, Member, ANC). 
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3. Socio-Economic Rights in the Interim 
Constitutional Period 
a. Socio-Economic Rights and the 
Constitutional Assembly 
Political circumstances were very different during the 
drafting period for the final Constitution. The ANC was no longer 
just one of nineteen negotiating parties58 or an inexperienced, 
recently-legalized political party. Following the elections, it became 
South Africa's dominant political force. The ANC received 62.7% of 
the popular vote in the first multiracial elections and Nelson 
Mandela was elected the President of the Republic of South Africa.59 
As a result of their sweeping electoral victory-the next most popular 
party in the elections (the NP) received only one-third as many 
votes-the ANC provided 312 members of the 490-member 
Constitutional Assembly that was to draft the final Constitution. 
Also, the ANC's primary negotiator of the provisions of the Interim 
Constitution, Cyril Ramaphosa, became Chairperson of the 
Constitutional Assembly, further strengthening the ANC's position.60 
In the debates, the party representatives addressed a variety 
of contentious issues, including the expansion and enforceability of 
socio-economic rights in the final Constitution. 
Inclusion of social rights was expressly supported in floor 
debates by representatives of the ANC and the Pan African 
Congress, which together represented 317 out of 490 members in the 
Constitutional Assembly.61 However, much of the debate over 
58. Du Plessis & Corder, supra note 13, at 4. 
59. Election '94 South Africa: The Campaign, Results and Future Prospects 
183 (Andrew Reynolds et al. eds., 1994). 
60. Const. Assembl., Annual Report May 1994-May 1995, at 3 (1995), 
available at http://www.polity.org.zaihtmVgovdocs/constitution/calANREPORT/ 
Ca94_95.pdf. General debates were held for the Constitutional Assembly as a 
whole but much of the detailed drafting was carried out by the nine Theme 
Committees, aided by ad hoc Technical Committees and led and managed by the 
Constitutional Committee. Id. 
61. Id. The individual members and their party affiliation are identified at 
the opening of each Constitutional Assembly session. Debates of the 
Constitutional Assembly, supra note 22, at vi-xi. 
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inclusion of social rights did not make it to the formal floor debates of 
the entire assembly. 
From the first session of the Assembly, the ANC signaled its 
commitment to socio-economic rights. In Cyril Ramaphosa's first 
address as Chairperson of the Assembly, he asserted that "the 
Constitution we draft must reinforce the aspirations of all our 
people" on socio-economic development matters.62 This statement 
reflected the culmination of ANC thought on the importance of the 
Bill of Rights generally and on the inclusion of social rights 
specifically. As expressed in the ANC's proposals for the final 
Constitution, entitled Building a United Nation: ANC Policy 
Proposals for the Final Constitution: 
The Bill of Rights shall affirm the right of all persons to 
have access to basic educational, health and welfare 
services. It will establish principles and mechanisms to 
ensure that there is an enforceable and expanding 
minimum floor of entitlements for all, in the areas of 
education, health and welfare. It shall commit the courts to 
take into account the need to reduce malnutrition, 
unemployment and homelessness when making any 
decisions. 63 
In light of the novel nature of their potential inclusion, however, 
justiciable social rights were by no means a primary focus of 
discussion. ANC speakers merely affirmed their support for inclusion 
and briefly addressed the arguments against such rights, generally 
confident that opposition to their inclusion would be insufficient.64 
62. 1 Debates of the Constitutional Assembly, supra note 22, at 7. 
63. Building a United Nation, supra note 38. 
64. 1 Debates of the Constitutional Assembly, supra note 22, at 136-37 
(statement of Brigitte Mabandla, Member, ANC) (reviewing arguments against 
inclusion during the drafting of the Interim Constitution); Id. at 152 (statement 
of Patricia De Lille, Member, Pan African Congress) (calling for greater social 
rights than are found in the Interim Constitution); Id. vol. 2, at 9 (statement of 
Thabo Mbeki, Member and future national President, ANC) (calling the inclusion 
of social rights "essential" on first day of open debate); Id. at 29 (statement of 
Richard Sizani, Member, Pan African Congress) (supporting a Bill of Rights that 
allows the state "to provide for the well-being of all members of our society ... "); 
Id. at 36 (statement of Kader Asmal, Member, ANC) (saying that the 
Constitution "must guarantee the twin goals of a better life for all-because the 
right to life is meaningless without the right to a better life-and a dramatically 
transformed life for the poor.") (emphases added). 
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Nevertheless, some opposition was expressed in formal 
debates, most often and forcefully by the NP: "[S]o-called second 
generation rights-for example, rights to social benefits . . . should 
not be entrenched as rights against the State. The State could simply 
not afford the cost of them."65 Additionally, some of the comments of 
assembly members, although not concerning social rights specifically, 
may have been targeted at the feared economic consequences of 
making such rights justiciable by courtS.66 The cost of such rights 
would threaten the economic viability of the state. With 
unacknowledged irony, the NP also claimed to oppose such rights 
because they could harm South Africa's "fragile" human rights 
culture that was "but 9 months old"--overlooking that the NP's own 
grossly unjust policies had given rise to that situation.67 The NP's 
proposed compromise on this issue was to implement constitutional 
provisions that were merely socio-economic "directive principles" for 
the national and provincial. governments (following the model of 
India68) rather than enforceable rights, but this idea received little 
support in the Constitutional Assembly.69 
The Democratic Party stressed feasibility arguments in 
opposing inclusion of constitutional rights, stressing that legislative 
programs could provide "a better and more worthwhile life for all 
South Africans. "70 The Democratic Party also argued that a 
constitution could not endure over multiple generations if social 
rights were included, since such rights necessarily change over time. 
If such rights were fulfilled, they would no longer need to be included 
and if they were not fulfilled, they would become mere "paper 
promises," weakening the legitimacy ofthe Constitution itselC' 
65. 2 Debates of the Constitutional Assembly, supra note 22, at 53 
(statement of Ray Radue, Member, National Party). 
66. [d. at 53. 
67. [d. 
68. See India Const. arts. 36-51 (containing the Directive Principles of 
State Policy). 
69. 2 Debates of the Constitutional Assembly, supra note 22, at 53 
(statement of Ray Radue, Member, National Party, Senate). 
70. [d. at 67 (statement of Anthony Leon, Member, Democratic Party, 
National Assembly) ("No constitution, however good it is, however we embolden it 
and however permissive it is, can actually deliver a better life for South 
Africans. "). 
71. [d. at 68 (Anthony Leon, Member, Democratic Party). 
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The ANC and other proponents of inclusion of enforceable 
social rights were supported by the Constitutional Assembly's Public 
Participation Programme, an ambitious (and, by most standards, 
rather successful) public education and popular involvement 
program.72 The Public Participation Programme gathered more than 
two million submissions from citizens and domestic groups. These 
comments were transcribed, translated, and submitted to the 
relevant committees of the Constitutional Assembly for their 
consideration. Theme Committee Four, which reviewed Fundamental 
Rights as part of the drafting process, received numerous petitions 
and individual comments on social rights-related issues during its 
discussion of the final Constitution's Bill of Rights.73 According to the 
Constitutional Assembly, "jobs, houses, the need to end crime and 
violence and better education" were the main issue of concern to 
South Africans. 74 
In the end, opposition arguments based on economics, 
feasibility, or the possibility of changing values were not enough to 
threaten the dominant desire to "give real hope in legal form to those 
without hope. "75 Furthermore, as the two-year drafting period drew 
to an end, the debates of the full Constitutional Assembly narrowly 
focused on a limited set of more sharply divisive issues: minority 
education, provincial power, labor issues, and co-governance. 76 
Inclusion of social rights seems to have been recognized as a foregone 
72. Const. Assembl., Rep. of S. Afr., The Public Participation Programme, 
http://web.archive.org/web/19991003165531/http://www.constitution.org.zalfct221 
15.html#PART (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) (recognizing the "fundamental 
significance of a Constitution in the lives of citizens" and thus seeking to place 
public participation "at the centre of the Constitution-making process."); see also 
Ebrahim, supra note 57, at 239-50 (detailing the successes of the Public 
Participation Programme in engaging the public). Additional popular support for 
social rights was expressed at public hearings, through petitions, and via other 
informal processes. See Sandra Liebenberg, The Interpretation of Socia-Economic 
Rights, in 2 Constitutional Law of South Africa § 33.2(a), n.3 (Matthew 
Chaskalson et al. eds., 2d ed. 2004). 
73. Liebenberg, supra note 72, § 33.2(a), n.3. 
74. Const. Assembl., Rep. of S. Afr., The Constitutional Assembly: Annual 
Report 1996, at 78 (1996), available at http://www.polity.org.za/html/ 
govdocs/constitutionlca/ANREPORT/Ca95_96.pdf (summarizing reports of an 
opinion poll about constitutional issues). 
75. 2 Debates of the Constitutional Assembly, supra note 22, at 36 (ANC 
member Kader Asmal). 
76. Ebrahim, supra note 57, at 200-08. 
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conclusion in this later, more democratic stage of the constitutional 
drafting process since it had such significant support by South 
Africa's general population and its largest political party. 
b. Final Constitution 
The ANC's long-standing support of a rights-based society 
and the popular need to address the socio-economic legacy of 
apartheid ultimately yielded a draft final Constitution inclusive of 
express constitutional rights to housing, food, water, social security, 
children's welfare, health care, and education, among other social 
rights. The relevant constitutional provisions are: 
26 Housing 
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate 
housing. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of this right. 77 
27 Health care, food, water and social security 
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to-
(a) health care services, including reproductive health 
care; 
(b) sufficient food and water; and 
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to 
support themselves and their dependants, 
appropriate social assistance. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of each of these rights. 
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical 
treatment.78 
28 Children 
(1) Every child has the right-
77. s. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, § 26. 
78. [d. § 27. 
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(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care 
services and social services . . .79 
29 Education 
(1) Everyone has the right-
(a) to a basic education, including adult basic 
education; and 
(b) to further education, which the state, through 
reasonable measures, must make progressively 
available and accessible.80 
It is important to note that the structure of the foregoing 
social rights provisions is different from traditional civil and political 
rights clauses. Almost all of the social rights sections have text that 
identifies judicially cognizable limitations on the scope of the right. 
For example, with respect to housing and health care, the state's 
positive obligations listed in subsection (1) are qualified by the 
language in subsection (2) about "available resources" and 
"progressive realization." These clauses temper the affirmative 
obligations of the state and add a level of required analysis for the 
reviewing court. These limitations are modeled after the language of 
the United Nations' International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights81 and are referred to as "internal limitations clauses" 
to distinguish them from the Section 36 general limitations clause in 
the Constitution.82 
79. [d. § 28. 
80. [d. § 29. 
81. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
opened for signature, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1,993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 
3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR] ("Each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to take steps ... to the maximum of its available resources, with a 
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures."). See discussion infra Part IILA.1. 
82. S. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, § 36: 
Limitation of rights 
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms 
of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors, including-
(a) the nature of the right; 
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Even though the Constitutional Assembly agreed on these 
socio-economic rights provisions, the Constitutional Court still 
needed to certifY the provisions (in conjunction with the entire text of 
the proposed final Constitution) before they could come into force. In 
order to determine if the social rights provisions were compatible 
with the mandatory Thirty-four Principles of the negotiated Interim 
Constitution, the Court was required to evaluate, among other 
things, whether or not the proposed rights met the Interim 
Constitution's requirement ofjusticiability. Hence, the Constitutional 
Court had ultimate authority, exercised in its 1996 In re: 
Certification of the South African Constitution opinion, to decide 
whether or not the South Mrican Constitution would include socio-
economic rights. 
III. OVERVIEW OF NON-JUSTICIABILITY ARGUMENTS 
When the abstract question of the justiciability of social 
rights reached the Constitutional Court in July 1996, the issue had 
already been widely debated. Any court would have been aware of 
the traditional consensus that social rights were not justiciable. This 
was especially true of the newly appointed justices of the South 
Mrican Constitutional Court, in light of their international 
(b) the importance ofthe purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its 
purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other 
provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
Like many constitutions, but notably not the United States Constitution, the 
South African Constitution has a general limitations clause that identifies 
criteria for examining whether a particular violation of an enumerated right is 
nevertheless acceptable under other, broader constitutional principles. 
The relationship between the internal and the general limitations clause is an 
unsettled area of the Court's jurisprudence. See Johan de Waal, lain Currie & 
Gerhard Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook 451 (4th ed. 2001); Liebenberg, 
supra note 72, § 33.10; Kevin Iles, Limiting SoCio·Economic Rights: Beyond the 
Internal Limitations Clause, 20 S. Afr. J. on Hum. Rts. 448 (2004); see also Jafiha 
v Schoeman and Others 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) paras. 31-33 (S. Afr.). 
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experience and broad exposure to human rights jurisprudence.83 
Additionally, the text of both the then-effective Interim Constitution 
and the proposed final Constitution required consideration of 
international law and encouraged review of comparable foreign law 
precedents.84 For these reasons, it is helpful to review the relevant 
arguments against justiciability prior to discussing the South Mrican 
Court's abstract approval of social rights in the In re: Certification of 
the South African Constitution opinion in order to better understand 
the milieu of its initial social rights jurisprudence. 
A. Non-Justiciability Arguments 
The arguments typically marshaled in opposition to judicial 
enforcement of socio-economic rights are manifold and confusing. In 
the most simplistic presentation of these arguments, the special 
nature of socio-economic rights and the institutional limitations of 
courts make adjudication of these rights impossible. To provide an 
overview of these arguments, this Article focuses first on the 
difficulties arising from the supposed differences between negative 
political rights and positive social rights. Many of the alleged 
distinctions between these two types of rights are historical and 
descriptive rather than inherent and normative. Second, this Article 
examines viewpoints opposing adjudication of such rights, that is, 
arguments about the legitimate and competent enforcement of social 
rights by judges and courts. 
It is not the purpose of this Article to comprehensively 
challenge the customary arguments against the adjudication of social 
rights. Rather, it is necessary to identify those arguments which 
would have been most pressing on the minds of the South Mrican 
Constitutional Court justices as they formulated their social rights 
jurisprudence. As will be shown, the arguments that were viewed as 
legitimate-even though not insurmountable-concerns by the Court 
are a much smaller subset of the larger population of abstract non-
83. Many of the justices, especially the ANC members, had joined foreign 
law faculties, human rights organizations, and NGOs, or had participated in 
meetings or international conferences related to apartheid and human rights. See 
Const. Ct. of S. Afr., http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za (last visited Jan. 13, 
2007) (follow "Judges" hyperlink) (providing biographies of current and former 
justices). 
84. S. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, § 39; S. Afr. (Interim) Const. 1993, ch. 3, § 35. 
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justiciability arguments. It is those "surviving" justiciability concerns 
that will be shown to have shaped the contours of the Court. 
1. Fundamentally Different Fundamental Rights 
The tension between civil and political rights and social and 
economic rights has a long history-a history that more often 
burdens rather than aids an understanding of their genuine 
differences. These differences were presumptively evidenced by the 
twentieth-century division of the rights in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (VDHR)85 into two distinct binding Covenants86-
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (lCCPR)87 
and the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR).88 
This division is certainly neither an originally-intended nor a 
necessary separation. The post-war UDHR envisions and expressly 
identifies the inherent and necessary interrelationship of the two 
types ofrights.89 But in the years following the drafting ofthe UDHR, 
global politics (most importantly the rise of Cold War tensions) and 
the formation of the first-generation factions in the United Nations 
led to a division of the rights promoted in the UDHR into the two 
distinct Covenants.90 Nevertheless, the indivisibility of social and 
political rights has been repeatedly affirmed by the international 
community. The 1993 Vienna Declaration reasserts the international 
law consensus: 
85. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 
3d Sess. U.N. Doc. N810 (1948) (hereinafter UDHR). 
86. Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, International Human Rights in 
Context: Law Politics Morals 245-48 (2d ed. 2000). 
87. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into 
force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR). The ICCPR was signed by South Africa 
on October 3, 1994 and ratified on December 10, 1998. 
88. ICESCR, supra note 81. The ICESCR was signed by South Africa on 
October 3, 1994 and has not been ratified as of January 2007. The first few years 
of democracy in South Africa saw a flurry of treaty acceptance and ratification 
since the apartheid government had been a pariah state, but the pace has 
slackened in later years. 
89. [d. South Africa, along with Saudi Arabia and the nations of the Soviet 
bloc, abstained from the vote on the UDHR at the time of its adoption. 
90. Steiner & Alston, supra note 77, at 238; William Felice, The Global 
New Deal: Economic and Social Human Rights in World Politics 7-8 (2003). 
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All human rights are universal, indivisible and 
interdependent and interrelated. The international 
community must treat human rights globally in a fair and 
equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same 
emphasis .... [Ilt is the duty of States, regardless of their 
political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and 
protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms. 91 
Although the initial distinction between ICCPR rights, so-
called "negative rights," and ICESCR rights, "positive rights," grew 
out of post-war political tensions, in more recent decades the division 
has been presumed to reflect fundamental differences in the nature 
of the rights themselves. Traditional political rights such as freedom 
of expression, equal protection, and due process are considered 
negative rights because they only require that the state refrain from 
interfering in the individual's exercise of the right; they are rights to 
be free from government interference. Socio-economic rights are 
identified as positive rights because they impose affirmative 
obligations upon the state to advance particular areas of social 
welfare. Under the dominant thinking that supports and encourages 
this separation, negative rights are justiciable because they involve 
discrete cases, they examine precise rights, and their remedies 
implicate only a cessation of action by government beyond the scope 
of judicial authority. Positive rights are merely (and necessarily) 
hortatory because they are vaguely worded, involve more complex 
issues, and would assign unacceptable positive obligations to 
government. 
Because the manner in which most academics and 
practitioners discuss rights and rights adjudication has been 
fundamentally shaped by systems in which only traditional civil and 
political rights have been justiciable, it becomes difficult to 
distinguish between inherent characteristics of social rights and 
their socially-constructed limitations. In classic arguments against 
the justiciability of social rights, these distinctions, often presented 
as a set of inviolable maxims, are coupled with arguments about the 
political legitimacy and institutional competence of courts in order to 
reject judicial enforcement of social welfare rights.92 For these 
91. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, June 25,1993, U.N. Doc. 
NCONF. 157/23, 1993, art. 5. 
92. See Steiner & Alston, supra note 86, at 237-320; Philip Alston, 
Economic and Social Rights, in Human Rights: An Agenda for the Next Century 
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reasons, discussions about the justiciability of social rights are 
inherently difficult.93 
Increasingly, academics and commentators have recognized 
the invalidity of this positive-negative distinction. 94 A typical 
negative right (e.g., freedom of expression) is equally imprecise and 
gives rise to a comparable need for interpretation (e.g., what limits 
exist, is there differential treatment for political, commercial, 
religious, hate-based or pornographic speech, what is the 
interrelationship with other political rights, etc.) as much as a typical 
positive right (e.g., right to education). Paradoxically, the argument 
that social rights are less precise than political rights may primarily 
rest on their extremely limited history of adjudication. 
Similarly, political rights can require assessment of 
significant factual or social phenomena. Consider, for example, the 
information reviewed to make a decision about the validity of voting 
procedures or disparate impact discrimination claims. And, even 
negative rights impose substantial affirmative obligations on states. 
After all, a voting rights decision can require expensive new 
procedures or materials or may vastly increase voter rolls, placing a 
huge financial burden on the state. 
137 (Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994); Dennis Davis, The 
Case against Inclusion of Socio-economic Demands. in a Bill of Rights except as 
Directive Principles, 8 S. Afr. J. on Hum. Rts. 475 (1992); Jackbeth K. 
Mapulanga-Hulston, Examining the Justiciability of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 6 Int'l J. Hum. Rts. 29 (2002). 
93. This paper is not specifically concerned with general critiques of the 
incorporation of social rights into constitutional texts nor with challenges to the 
value of written Bills of Rights generally-both of which are frequently conflated 
with critiques of social rights justiciability. The starting point for this inquiry is a 
country that includes social rights in its written constitution. There are 
arguments against judicial review of social rights that are distinct from (or more 
compelling than) traditional majoritarian arguments against judicial review and 
I will reference those to the extent the South African situation reveals something 
about them, but I will avoid the well-trod territory of judicial review apologetics. 
94. See Cecile Fabre, Constitutionalising Social Rights, 6 J. Pol. Phil. 263 
(1998); Stephen Holmes & Cass Sunstein, The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty 
Depends on Taxes (1999); Cass Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: Roosevelt's 
Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need It Now More than Ever (2005); see also 
Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem, Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable 
Guarantees? Social Rights in a New South African Constitution, 141 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1, 48-71 (1992) (rejecting the negative-positive distinction because the 
general notion of rights connotes positive and negative duties equally). 
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In these ways, an a priori distinction between negative and 
positive rights is inconsistent with a genuine understanding of the 
rights. This is not to assert that there are no differences between 
political and social rights. Indeed there are; even at an abstract level, 
social rights are more frequently related to social policy, a more 
volatile area of government policy for most nations. In theory, the 
social rights remedies imposed by a court could be overwhelming to a 
state, such as if a court were to require the government to provide 
universal employment, universal education through to the university 
level, free unlimited health care, etc. But this is the enforcement 
issue, not the justiciability issue. The nature of the rights themselves 
is not a legitimate basis for rejecting their justiciability. The South 
Mrican Court has recognized this as well.95 A valid rejection of social 
rights justiciability must rely on their inability to be properly or 
effectively adjudicated. Hence, the real area of concern is not the 
nature of the rights but what some commentators fear judges and 
courts will do with such rights. 
2. Justiciability: The Legitimacy and Competence of 
Courts 
An additional series of contemporary arguments against the 
justiciability of social rights can loosely be divided into concerns 
about political legitimacy and concerns about institutional 
competence.96 These critiques are about judicial review per se rather 
than about socio-economic rights per se, as discussed in the previous 
section. 
a. Legitimacy: Overreaching Courts? 
Legitimacy arguments focus on the inappropriateness of 
assigning the task of interpreting social values to an unelected 
judiciary, and, most critically, of allowing judicial interference in the 
95. In re: Certification of the South African Constitution, supra note 7, 
paras. 78-79. 
96. The division presented here is reconfigured from several different 
schemes for classifying non-justiciability arguments. See, e.g., Fabre, supra note 
94, at 263; see also Mureinik, supra note 31, at 464; see also Davis, supra note 92, 
at 475 (all providing a helpful analysis of the variety of non-justiciability 
arguments). 
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allocation of state monies-a core legislative task. The primary 
concern is that crafting and assigning a remedy in a social rights case 
is too similar to the legislature's traditional role of deciding policy 
and creating and implementing programs. To view such rights as 
justiciable would necessarily and impermissibly intrude on the 
province of the legislative branch-most glaringly when a court 
overrides a legislative act regarding social welfare and asserts a 
different course of action for the state. 
It may be that this argument would carry more weight in 
countries that have not expressly allocated such authority to the 
judiciary or where such rights are not enumerated in the nation's 
constitution; that is not the case in South Africa. Most legitimacy 
critiques are considerably less persuasive in the South Mrican 
context because the Court is interpreting enumerated social rights in 
accordance with its broad institutional mandate from the 
Constitution.97 The Constitutional Assembly explicitly assigned the 
task of interpreting social rights to the judiciary in the South African 
Constitution. Moreover, neither the Constitutional text nor the 
discussion of the Constitutional Assembly reveals or implies that 
social rights were to be enforced or interpreted in a manner different 
from the standard of traditional political rights.98 The text of the 
social rights provisions echoes the language of political rights 
provisions and is placed in the Bill of Rights without distinction 
based on the kind of rights. Indeed, Section 7(2) requires the state to 
"respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights. "99 
Legitimacy concerns may also reflect a broad-based distrust 
of judicial review more than a specific concern about social rights 
adjudication. This distrust is not reflected in the South Mrican 
Constitution's division of authority among branches of government. 
Indeed, this viewpoint overlooks the fact that while the Constitution 
includes the principle of separation of powers, the South African 
. Constitutional Court is first among equals. The Constitutional Court 
97. S. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, §§ 8 (Application) and 39 (Interpretation of 
the Bill of Rights); see also infra Part IV.A. 
98. The obvious exception here is the internal limitation clause ("within 
available resources" and "progressive realization"), which is a limitation in the 
text of the right itself rather than a limitation on the judicial role. See S. Afr. 
Const. 1996, ch. 2, § 36(2). 
99. [d. § 7(2). 
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was given powers in the transition to democracy and still retains 
powers which evidence its role as a uniquely powerful institution-in 
contrast with other Constitutional courts and in comparison with 
other South African government entities. 10o In South Africa, the 
Constitution marked an explicitly moral break from the past and 
reflected a fundamental choice to form a state with certain social 
values-including social justice as a means of advancing substantive 
equality. The Court bears a more significant proportion of the 
responsibility for policing the newly-entrenched moral pre-
commitments of the constitutional generation; such a distribution of 
power weakens the claims of judicial illegitimacy in this area. Given 
the Constitutional Court's unique mandate and express powers, 
legitimacy arguments are not a significant challenge to social rights 
justiciability in the South African context. 
b. Competency: Appropriately Skilled Courts? 
Institutional competence arguments focus on procedural 
limitations, a court's capacity to attain and assess extensive 
information, and problematic aspects of a court's potential remedies. 
These arguments tend to be interrelated and reinforcing. Specifically, 
the concerns are whether a court or judge has the institutional 
capability to appropriately adjudicate social rights when confronted 
with a single complainant or group (the "plaintiff problem"); to access 
and review all necessary specialized information (the "information 
problem"); and to adequately remedy any violation of the right in 
view of the limited scope of the problem before the court---especially 
when contrasted with the required universality of the solution (the 
"remedy problem"). 
According to these critiques, courts typically review specific 
controversies concerning individual claimants, a procedure that is 
inappropriate for social rights adjudication because limited 
deliberation and focused remedies cannot easily account for all 
similarly situated individuals. The deciding judge is exposed to a 
single snapshot (e.g., a particular homeless individual as a plaintiff) 
of the larger issue (inadequate housing) and has only the information 
presented by the parties upon which to adjudicate. This not only 
100. [d. ch. 2, §§ 38 (Enforcement of Rights) and 39 (Interpretation of Bill of 
Rights), and ch. 8, §§ 165 (Judicial Authority) and 167 (Constitutional Court). 
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compromises the interpretation of the right but it reveals a further 
reason that this work is inappropriate for judges. An individual 
common law judge cannot possibly accrue the kind of institutional 
sophistication to make decisions of the scale required by social rights 
adjudication since she does not have access to the necessary 
information resources. Nor can a typical common law judge order (or 
fund) relevant factual inquiries as a legislature or the executive 
could. Presumably, either a court will provide a narrow, 
individualized remedy for the present party only, ignoring the host of 
absent but similarly situated persons, or it will evaluate all claims 
based on the limited (and possibly idiosyncratic) information from a 
single plaintiff. 
c. The Plaintiff, Information, and Remedy 
Problems 
Dividing the more general competency-based critiques of 
social rights adjudication into discrete components-the plaintiff, 
information, and remedy problems-allows a more thorough analysis 
of the arguments. IOI More importantly, it allows one to identifY those 
elements of the competency critique that are relevant in the South 
Mrican context-and would therefore need to be addressed by the 
Constitutional Court as it crafts a social rights jurisprudence. 
The plaintiff problem is partially addressed by the broad 
access provisions of the South Mrican Constitution. Generally 
speaking, the jurisdiction of the Court is very broad and access to the 
Court is permissive, allowing discretionary access on appeal, 
required review for lower court judgments declaring a law 
unconstitutional, discretionary direct access to the Court, and even 
abstract review of laws prior to implementation by Parliament. 102 
Individuals, classes of complainants, associations, and "anyone acting 
101. This division of issues is loosely based on a general discussion of the 
functional differences between legislatures and courts in David Shapiro, Courts, 
Legislatures and Paternalism, 74 Va. L. Rev. 519, 551-55 (1988). 
102. S. Mr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, § 167; see Eric C. Christiansen, Essay: An 
Appropriately Activist Court: South African Constitutional Court Rights 
Jurisprudence, 1995-2001, at Part II (unpublished manuscript on file with the 
author) (discussing the procedural authority of the Court and its effect on the 
Court's influence). 
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in the public interest" can bring a claim before the Court.I03 This 
lessens the potential severity of the problem because the 
Constitution allows all those concerned to join in the claim before the 
Court. But these broad access provisions only address part of the 
plaintiff problem because nothing compels all concerned parties, or 
organizations representing their interests, to join in a pending action. 
Valid concerns exist that an individual complainant or even a group 
of complainants will inadequately frame a larger social rights 
problem. I04 Unlike some of the legitimacy issues discussed previously, 
the plaintiff problem remains a valid concern that the Court would 
have recognized as a challenge to be addressed in the formulation of 
its jurisprudence. 
The information problem highlights a fundamental difference 
between courts and legislatures. If a legislature wishes to implement 
a new social program, it has the capacity to engage in fact-finding 
and research and to requisition state funds to ensure those 
investigations happen. Courts traditionally work exclusively from the 
record before them and appellate courts work from the factual record 
of the trial court. As with the plaintiff problem, certain procedures 
and practices of the South Mrican Constitutional Court partially 
address this concern. The Court routinely issues orders to the parties 
prior to the hearing, during the hearing, or even during post-hearing 
deliberations that invite one or both of the parties to make 
submissions of reports, studies, or other factual documentation for 
the justices to review. The broad discretion of the Court to order such 
filings is based on its constitutional mandate, and the Court has 
frequently used this practice to solicit additional information or to 
permit amici filings of interested parties. lOS This expands the Court's 
capacity'to gather information even though it does not fully address 
the concern. It allows the Court to request any information it 
requires but does not ensure the quality of the information received, 
nor does it ensure that such investigations have actually happened or 
that the information is available to be presented to the Court. 
Ultimately, the Court must still evaluate whether or not the 
103. S. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, § 38 and ch. 8, § 172(2)(d). 
104. In many ways, this difficulty is similar to the plaintiff problem 
encountered in class action lawsuits. 
105. ld. ch 8, § 173 (the Constitutional Court has "inherent power to 
protect and regulate their own process . . . taking into account the interests of 
justice."). 
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information it receives is sufficient for its decision-making 
requirements. The information problem is also a concern the Court 
knew it would have to address as it developed its jurisprudence. 
Like its procedures and rules regarding access, the remedial 
powers of the Constitutional Court are very broad-both in initial 
grant and in their interpretation by the Court itself.lo6 The Court 
must strike down a provision it finds to be unconstitutional and it 
may make any "just and equitable" remedial order to the successful 
party.107 As a consequence, the remedy problem, the third difficulty 
presented by the adjudication of socio-economic rights, remains 
significant. How does a court appropriately tailor a social rights 
remedy so as not to bankrupt the state? The constitutional text of 
most of the social rights provides guidance through the internal 
limitations clause (permitting "progressive realization" of the right 
and only requiring state action "within its available resources"I08), 
but the text fails to identify how the Court should evaluate the 
relative speed of realization or the true extent of available 
resources-a built-in constitutional limit on the remedies. The 
incapacity of courts to formulate just and appropriate remedies 
without usurping legislative authority over budgeting is a 
fundamental argument of justiciability opponents. This is an 
additional concern the Court knew it would have to address in 
formulating its jurisprudence. 
106. [d. § 172 states: 
(1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a 
court-
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is 
inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent 
of its inconsistency; and 
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, 
including-
(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the 
declaration of invalidity; and 
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity 
for any period and on any conditions, to allow the 
competent authority to correct the defect. 
107. [d. § 172. 
108. [d. ch. 2, § 27(2). 
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3. Non-Justiciability Arguments Before the South 
African Constitutional Court 
The South Mrican Constitutional Court articulates a 
jurisprudence that must account not for the numerous historical 
critiques of social rights adjudication but rather for the limited 
number of critiques that remain once the Court has set aside the 
discredited descriptions of social rights and the concerns that are 
inapt under the specific South African constitutional model. 
As discussed above, the traditional critiques start with 
concerns about social rights per se. These arguments are mostly 
misguided in their unsubstantiated distinctions between (positive) 
social rights and (negative) political rights. The strongest challenges 
highlight the novelty of enforcing such rights and the relative dearth 
of outside guidance with respect to their interpretation and 
application. Secondly, the justiciability critiques focus on judicial 
review per se-arguments based on the legitimacy and competence of 
courts. Here, some concerns are partially addressed by the expansive 
role granted to the Court by the South African Constitution: its 
generous access provisions, its broad discretion to solicit information, 
and its mandate to advance constitutional values. The strongest 
critiques, arguably the only valid critiques in light of the unique 
constitutional authority of the South Mrican Constitutional Court, 
are: (1) the potentially insufficient number, diversity, or relevance of 
its plaintiffs; (2) the difficulty of gathering and considering the 
relevant factual information; and (3) the appropriateness of the 
remedial actions available to the Court, especially as related to the 
fiscal impact of decisions. It is these concerns-the plaintiff problem, 
the information problem, and the remedy problem-as well as the 
pure novelty of the adjudication of socio-economic rights that would 
have occupied the mind of a diligent justice embarking on a novel 
South African socio-economic rights jurisprudence. As we shall now 
examine, the manner in which the Court addresses these challenges 
shapes the jurisprudence of the South Mrican Constitutional Court. 
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IV. SOCIo-ECONOMIC RIGHTS BEFORE THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT 
A. The Constitutional Court as an Institution 
The South African Constitutional Court's socio-economic 
rights cases and the jurisprudence they embody must be understood 
in the context of the Court as a uniquely powerful institution with 
broad constitutional and moral authority to advance the human 
rights goals of the post-apartheid South Mrica. At his retirement, the 
first President of the Court affirmed its unique role: 
What the Constitution demands of [the Court's justices] is 
that a legal order be established that gives substance to its 
founding values-democracy, dignity, equality and freedom; 
a legal order consistent with the constitutional goal of 
improving the quality of life of all citizens, and freeing the 
potential of each person. The challenge facing us as a 
nation is to create such a society; the challenge facing the 
judiciary is to build a legal framework consistent with this 
goal. 109 
The South African Constitutional Court commenced work in 
February 1995 without many of the infirmities that typify many new 
constitutional courtS.110 First, there was no uncertainty about the 
Court's judicial review authority; it had a clear mandate for its duties 
in the Constitution. Moreover, South Africa did not lack a judicial 
culture or judicial structures as many new democracies do. It had an 
established infrastructure for enforcement and adjudication that is 
typically underdeveloped in fledgling democracies. Also, the Court 
had extensive political and popular support from its initiation. III 
109. Arthur Chaskalson, former Chief Justice of the Const. Ct. of S. Afr., 
Justice Chaskalson's Farewell Speech (June 2, 2005), 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/sitelfarewell.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 
2007) [hereinafter Justice Chaskalson's Farewell Speech]. Chaskalson's title and 
role was changed from President of the Constitutional Court to Chief Justice of 
South Africa during his tenure on the Court. 
110. Much of the information in this section draws upon Christiansen, An 
Appropriately Activist Court, supra note 102. 
111. Although there was significant debate about the form of the Bill of 
Rights, formation of a constitutional court was a given in the constitutional 
drafting process, accepted by all of the negotiating parties at the initial 
constitutional negotiations, and unquestioned in the drafting of the final 
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As a consequence, the Court was not focused on establishing 
institutional legitimacy, rule of law, or judicial systems. It was 
expected to transform the judiciary that had functioned under the 
apartheid system for decades. The broad authority of the 
Constitutional Court allowed it to supervise the lower courts and to 
enforce the new constitutional values. Only a court with very 
extensive jurisdiction, liberal allowance of access, and broad remedial 
authority could oversee the reformation, or at least the functional 
obedience, of the judiciary.1I2 Granting the Court these capacities 
reflected a conscious vesting of authority in the Constitutional Court. 
Moreover, the power of the Court is only minimally 
restrained by external forces. As a new institution interpreting a new 
constitution in a new democracy, the Court is working from a clean 
slate. At present, it must reconcile its judgments with less than 
twelve years of precedents. I 13 Even the Court's required surveys of 
foreign and international law do little to constrain the outcome of its 
cases because of the non-binding and often malleable nature of 
Constitution. See Albie Sachs, A Bill of Rights for South Africa: Areas of 
Agreement and Disagreement, 21 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 13 (1989-1990); see 
also e-mail from Albie Sachs, Justice, Const. Ct. of S. Afr., to author (January 6, 
2000) (on file with author). 
112. Because there was no purge of the civil service or of the judiciary at 
the birth of the newly democratic South Africa in 1994, the judges filling the 
courts of South Mrica-now empowered to enforce the country's progressive 
human rights provisions against a host of new laws issued from the first freely-
elected, multiracial Parliament-were the judges appointed by and tutored in the 
apartheid law and parliamentary sovereignty of the previous regime. Broad 
jurisdiction allowed the Court to address counter-constitutional judgments in all 
courts whether their judges were reviewing the constitutionality of laws passed 
by national or provincial legislatures, reviewing executive or administrative 
action, or hearing appeals from a lower court. This allowed the Court to supervise 
the new guardians of the Constitution. 
113. The Court heard its first case on April 5, 1995 and announced its first 
judgment on June 6, 1995. State v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) at 656 (S. Afr.); 
State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
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foreign precedent. I 14 Political control over the Court is also extremely 
limited due to provisions to ensure judicial independence. I IS 
The South Mrican Constitutional Court is centrally involved 
in the ideological project of the "new South Mrica." As former Chief 
Justice Chaskalson described it, "[u]nder our Constitution the 
normative value system and the goal of transformation, are 
intertwined."116 This ideology is focused on an image of South Africa 
as a reformed nation-not just a liberal democracy but a "human 
rights state"-which is in the process of rising to its great potential to 
transform itself and to be an example to other nations. I I? The Court 
plays the role of chief architect of a "society based on democratic 
values, social justice and fundamental human rights.,,118 And, with an 
eye on the international community, the Court's work helps to build 
a "united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place 
as a sovereign state in the family of nations.,,119 In pursuit of this 
project, the Court has boldly advanced traditional political rights-
reviewing controversial matters and issuing disfavored rulings 
related to the death penalty, same-sex marriage, and political 
amnesty for apartheid crimes, among other issues. 12o Furthermore, 
114. S. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, § 39(1) (when interpreting the Bill of Rights, 
the Court "must consider international law; and may consider foreign law"). 
Typically the Court reviews contrary holdings merely to differentiate them from 
South African circumstances and reviews consistent opinions only as support for 
its conclusions. 
115. [d. § 177. (Judges serve non-renewable terms and can be removed only 
by a declaration by a politically independent commission in conjunction with a 
super-majority of the Assembly.) Judicial independence was also a frequently 
discussed issue in the constitutional debates. See generally Debates of the 
Constitutional Assembly, supra note 22 (reflecting how judicial independence was 
a recurring theme in presentations by members of various political parties). 
116. Justice Chaskalson's Farewell Speech, supra note 109. 
117. S. Afr. Const. 1996, pmbl. 
118. [d. 
119. [d. 
120. State v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.) (holding the death 
penalty unconstitutional); National Coalition of Gay and Lesbian Equality 
(NCGLE) v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (S. Afr.) (striking down 
apartheid-era sodomy laws); Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie 
2006(1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.) (finding the restriction of civil marriage to 
heterosexuals to be unconstitutional); and Azanian People's Organization 
(AZAPO) v President of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) (S. Afr.) 
(upholding post-apartheid amnesty law under the Interim Constitution). 
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the Court has made full and frequent use of its broad remedial 
powers-overturning provincial and national laws, invalidating 
provincial constitutional provisions, "reading in" text to remedy 
constitutional violations, and postponing enforcement to require 
executive or legislative action. 121 
The development of South Africa's case law related to socio-
economic rights must be understood in the context of an 
authoritative, respected, and transformation-oriented court-a court 
that has expansively interpreted political rights and generously 
applied its remedial powers. 
B. Socio-Economic Rights Cases Before the Constitutional 
Court . 
1. In re: Certification 
The Court began hearing substantive cases (under the 
Interim Constitution) in February 1995. When the Constitutional 
Assembly finished the official draft of the final Constitution in late 
1996, the Court had to adjudicate a singularly important case; it had 
to "certify" the proposed final Constitution by ensuring that none of 
its provisions conflicted with the Thirty-four Principles agreed upon 
by the ANC, the outgoing white minority government, and other 
political parties at CODESA. 122 The Thirty-four Principles in the 
121. See, e.g., Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) 
para. 19 (S. Afr.) (The Court "may even have to fashion new remedies to secure 
the protection and enforcement" of the Constitution); Fraser v Children's Court, 
Pretoria North 1997 (2) SA 261 (Ce) (S. Afr.) (suspending enforcement of the 
court order striking down a portion of the state's adoption laws to permit 
Parliament to amend the law without the adverse consequences that would result 
from an immediate declaration of invalidity); National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality (NCGLE) v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) para. 
86 (S. Afr.) (The Court "cured" the unconstitutional provision of the immigration 
law "by reading in, after the word 'spouse,' the following words: 'or partner, in a 
permanent same-sex life partnership.'"). 
122. The initial review by the Constitutional Court found that "we 
ultimately come to the conclusion that the [proposed textl cannot be certified as it 
stands because there are several respects in which there has been non-
compliance with the [Thirty-four Principlesl," but also noted that, "in general and 
in respect of the overwhelming majority of its provisions, the CA has attained 
[itsl goal." Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re 
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Interim Constitution specifically required or prohibited certain 
provisions in the final Constitution. 123 Since the draft included socio-
economic rights, the Court had to adjudicate whether socio-economic 
rights could be properly included in the text of the 1996 Constitution 
before it considered its first substantive social rights claim. 
The challenges to articles 26 (Housing), 27 (Health care, food, 
water, and social security) and 29 (Education) were based on 
Constitutional Principle II and Constitutional Principle VI of the 
Thirty-four Principles. Principle II required: 
Everyone shall enjoy all universally accepted fundamental 
rights, freedoms and civil liberties, which shall be provided 
for and protected by entrenched and justiciable provisions 
in the Constitution, which shall be drafted after having 
given due consideration to inter alia the fundamental rights 
contained in Chapter 3 of this [Interim) Constitution. 124 
And, Principle VI required: "There shall be a separation of powers 
between the legislature, executive and judiciary, with appropriate 
checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and 
openness.,,125 Groups filing arguments in opposition to the inclusion 
of social rights claimed that the rights violated Principles II and VI 
in light of the fact that the rights (1) were not "universally accepted 
fundamental rights," (2) were not justiciable, and, more generally, (3) 
violated the constitutional separation of powers by impermissibly 
intruding on the legislative arena. 126 
With respect to Principle II, the Court had already held that 
"universally accepted fundamental rights" did not constitute the 
Certification of the amended text of the Const. of the Rep. of S. Afr. 1996 (4) SA 97 
(CC) para. 31 (S. Afr.). Certification of the subsequently amended text was 
granted by the full court in Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: 
In re Certification of the amended text of the Const. of the Rep. of S. Afr. 1996 
1997 (2) SA 97 (CC) para. 205 (S. Afr.). 
123. S. Afr. (Interim) Const. 1993, sched. 4; see also supra Part II. A. 
124. S. Mr. (Interim) Const. 1993, sched. 4, Principle II. 
125. Id. Principle VI. 
126. The opposition groups included the South African Institute for Race 
Relations (an organization supporting "economic liberalism"), the Free Market 
Foundation, and the Gauteng Association of Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry. See In re: Certification of the South African Constitution, supra note 7, 
paras. 76-78; Liebenberg, supra note 2, at *1, n.ll. For a report of some of the 
Court's discussion of the certification question as it relates to socio-economic 
rights, see The Post-Apartheid Constitutions, supra note 25. 
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ceiling for rights, but rather the floor, and that they could be 
supplemented by the Constitutional Assembly with "other rights not 
universally accepted."127 It went on to address the other two issues, 
holding: 
(W]e are ofthe view that [social] rights are, at least to some 
extent, justiciable ... many of the civil and political rights 
entrenched in the [proposed constitutional text] will give 
rise to similar budgetary implications without 
compromising their justiciability. The fact that socio-
economic rights will almost inevitably give rise to such 
implications does not seem to us to be a bar to their 
. t" b'l't 128 JUs lCla 1 1 y. 
With respect to Principle VI, the Court held simply and with little 
analysis, "it cannot be said that by including socio-economic 
rights ... a task is conferred upon the courts so different from that 
ordinarily conferred upon them ... that it results in a breach of the 
separation ofpowers."129 
The threshold importance of the Certification judgment is 
that it permitted inclusion of socio-economic rights in the final text of 
the South Mrican Constitution. Furthermore, the Court asserted 
some justiciability of such rights: "At the very minimum, socio-
economic rights can be negatively protected from improper 
invasion."13o The Court thereby declared a "floor" of minimum 
justiciability; it will not permit government interference with access 
to the social right in question nor discrimination in provision of such 
rights. 
The questions that remained after the Certification opinion 
were many. While the justiciability question (whether such rights 
could be adjudicated) was answered, the enforceability question (how 
such rights would be adjudicated) remained. Two years later, the 
Court addressed the enforcement question in its first substantive 






In re: Certification of the South African Constitution, supra note 7, 
Id. para. 78. 
Id. para. 77. 
Id. para. 78. 
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2. Soobramoney 
In 1997, the Constitutional Court decided its first substantive 
socio-economic rights case, Thiagraj Soobramoney v Minister of 
Health, KwaZulu-Natal. 131 Mr. Soobramoney was a terminally-ill 
diabetic man in the final stages of chronic renal failure. Due to 
limited hospital resources, he was denied dialysis treatment that 
could have prolonged his life under a state medical policy that 
restricted dialysis availability to patients whose acute renal failure 
could be remedied through such treatment or to patients eligible for a 
kidney transplant. Mr. Soobramoney's kidney failure could not be 
remedied and he was ineligible for a transplant because of other 
health issues. The appellant wanted the Court to order the hospital 
to provide the treatment to extend his life. He relied on Section 27(3) 
of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o one may be refused 
emergency medical treatment,,,132 and Section 11 of the Constitution, 
which states that "[e]veryone has the right to life,"133 to claim that 
after significant time without the treatment, his now-imminent 
death created a medical emergency upon which his life depended. 134 
The Court found that the right to "emergency medical 
treatment" could not extend to life-prolonging treatment for 
terminally ill patients. Not only did the ordinary meaning of the 
words argue against that interpretation, but the consequences of 
such an interpretation in the circumstance of limited resources would 
be a functional prioritization of health maintenance of the terminally 
ill over all other health needs. The Court found that the "context" of 
the right-usually examined by the Court to justify a generous 
interpretation135-encouraged a narrow reading of this particular 
right. Additionally, the Court held that the right not to be refused 
emergency medical treatment was best understood in the context of 
131. Soobramoney, supra note 1. 
132. 8 Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, §27(3). 
133. Id. §11. 
134. Soobramoney, supra note 1, para. 7. 
135. See, e.g., State v Makwanyane 1995 (3) 8A 391 (CC) para. 10 (8. Afr.) 
(context "includes the history and background to the adoption ofthe Constitution, 
other provisions of the Constitution itself, and, in particular, the provisions of 
[the Bill of Rightsl of which [they are] part."). 
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the Section 27 right to health care rather than in conjunction with 
the right to life. 136 
Although it was not argued by the appellants, the Court went 
on to consider whether the Section 27(1) right of access to health care 
services provided relief for this appellant. 137 The Court held that 
Section 27 rights must be read in the context of the state's limited 
resources as expressly stated in 27(2), the internal limitation clause: 
"The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation 
of [the right of access to healthcare]."138 The provincial government 
offered evidence that it had to balance a great number of health 
priorities with a woefully inadequate budget. The Court concluded 
that "[a] court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken 
in good faith by the political organs and medical authorities whose 
responsibility it is to deal with such matters."139 Upon examination of 
the actual medical and financial bases for the policy, the source and 
enforcement of the policy, and both the health services and general 
budgets of the KwaZulu-Natal province, the Court rejected Mr. 
Soobramoney's arguments and ruled for the Minister of Health. 140 
The Soobramoney decision is important for several reasons .. 
First, the duty of the state in relation to socio-economic rights was 
affirmed in clear terms. 141 This is an important step beyond the mere 
abstract assertion of justiciability in the Certification opinion. The 
Court expressly finds that the state's affirmative obligation (in 
conjunction with the previously-asserted justiciability of social 
rights) yields judicially enforceable socio-economic rights. 
Second, the Court identified a standard of qualified deference 
to the legislature. Reviewing the state health care policies at issue, 
the Court stressed the existence of established, public guidelines that 
conform to legitimate medical opinions. The Court implies that the 
analysis would be different where the guidelines are "unreasonable 
136. Soobramoney, supra note 1, paras. 14-19. 
137. Id. paras. 19-36. 
138. S Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, § 27(2). 
139. Soobramoney, supra note 1, para. 29. 
140. Id. para. 36. 
141. Id. ("The state has a constitutional duty to comply with the 
obligations imposed on it by s[ectionj 27 ofthe Constitution."). 
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or . . . were not applied fairly and rationally.,,142 The Court 
highlighted that the decisions taken in these circumstances were 
appropriately divided between politicians and non-political 
specialists (here, medical experts): "These choices involve difficult 
decisions to be taken at the political level in fixing the health budget, 
and at the functional level in deciding upon the priorities to be 
met."143 The relative apportionment of decision making between 
political and functional "levels" is not revealed in this case, and thus 
little guidance is available for future cases, because here the Court 
found a fair and rational policy.l44 
Third, it is crucial to notice that the Court reviewed the 
actual evidence of the financial status of the hospital and the 
KwaZulu Province and confirmed that other practical solutions were 
considered. 145 This shows that the Court's holding is deferential to 
economic limitations, but it is not deferential to the state's mere 
assertions of economic limitations. Where reasonable resource 
limitations diminish the extent of a constitutional right, such 
limitations must be proven to the Court. The government cannot "toll 
the bell of lack of resources" and expect the Court to passively defer 
to the legislative judgment. 146 
Fourth, the Court is very concerned with providing a solution 
for the larger societal problem represented by Soobramoney, and not 
merely solving the appellant's problem. "If everyone in the same 
condition as the appellant were to be admitted the carefully tailored 
programme would collapse and no one would benefit .... "147 In this 
way, the Court acknowledges and at least partially addresses the 
plaintiffs problem, the single controversy-based objection to social 
rights adjudication. Realism and perspective will temper 
constitutional obligations. 
Finally, the Court stressed the connection between the 
available resources and the extent of the right: "the obligations 








[d. para. 25. 
[d. para. 29 (emphases added). 
See discussion of "reasonableness" in Grootboom and TAC infra Part 
Soobramoney, supra note 1, paras. 25-28. 
[d. para. 52 (Sachs, J., concurring). 
[d. para. 26. 
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housing, health care, food, water, and social security are dependent 
upon the resources available for such purposes, and . . . the 
corresponding rights themselves are limited by reason of the lack of 
resources."148 The Court thus identifies two further aspects of socio-
economic rights enforceability. The state bears the burden of proving 
its actions were reasonable in light of limited resources, rather than, 
as with political rights adjudication, proving an allowable limitation 
of the right according to the general limitations clause. 149 
Additionally, this formulation means that the state's obligation is 
dynamic. It will change as circumstances change, and presumptively 
it will increase over time. Hence, the Court may revisit the 
reasonableness of static government programs. Even more 
importantly, to the extent that the scope of the right is delineated by 
the socio-economic right's internal limitations clause, the Court 
avoids some of the issues raised by the remedy problem. This is 
because the size of the remedy depends on the extent of the right, 
which is partially determined by the availability of resources. 
It should also be noted that there were several ways in which 
Soobramoney was an easy first case for the Court. There was no 
principled way to provide a remedy for this appellant only, and 
ordering the requested remedy for all similarly-situated patients was 
a fiscal impossibility that even the judgment's critics recognized. 
Also, medical matters possess more verifiable evidence regarding cost 
and the impact of withholding versus providing rights-related 
treatment. Because relatively precise financial data was available to 
assess the costs of various options, a somewhat more objective 
148. [d. para. 11. 
149. S. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, § 36 [Limitation ofrightsl: 
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms 
oflaw of general application to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors, including-
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance ofthe purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other 
provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
364 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [38:321 
balancing of priorities was possible-at least in comparison to some 
other socio-economic rights. But after Soobramoney, many questions 
remained. And the death of Mr. Soobramoney two days after the 
judgment was announced fueled popular concerns that the Court was 
unwilling to enforce the Constitution's social rights. 150 
3. Grootboom 
Five years passed between Soobramoney and the 
Constitutional Court's next significant ruling related to a social 
right-years of very slow progress on economic fronts and increasing 
crime and violence for many impoverished South Africans. Economic 
opportunity was still in short supply and vast numbers of South 
Africans were living in desperate poverty. For those who hoped the 
Court would take an active role in the advancement of socio-economic 
opportunity and substantive equality, the Court's jurisprudence-
other than the hopeful abstractions in the Certification opinion-had 
been disappointing. In fact, the Court itself acknowledged "the harsh 
reality that the Constitution's promise of dignity and equality for all 
remains for many a distant dream.,,151 
In 2001, the Court returned to the adjudication of socio-
economic rights with the housing rights case Government of Republic 
of South Africa v Irene Grootboom and Others. 152 The Court took 
several months to consider the claims (rather than two weeks as with 
Soobramoney). As a consequence, the Court, in a unanimous 
judgment, presented a much more detailed and thorough opinion 
than it had in the previous case. 
The case reviewed the obligations of the state as a result of 
Section 26, Housing: "[e]veryone has the right to have access to 
adequate housing" and "[t]he state must take reasonable legislative 
and other measures, within its available resource, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of this right .... ,"153 and Section 28, Children: 
150. Albie Sachs, Social and Economic Rights: Can They be Made 
Justiciable?, 53 SMU L. Rev. 1381, 1386 (2000) ("The public was angry with the 
Court-they felt it should have done something, anything, to save a life."). 
151. Grootboom, supra note 9, para. 2. 
152. [d. 
153. S. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, §26. 
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"[e]very child has the right to ... basic nutrition, shelter, basic 
health care services and social services .... "154 
The facts that gave rise to the Grootboom dispute are no less 
disturbing for being one instance of a common failure of South 
Africa's housing infrastructure. Irene Grootboom became homeless 
when she was required to leave a squatter settlement on private land 
that had been selected for construction of state-sponsored low-income 
housing. She and the 510 children and 390 adults who joined her suit 
were then forcibly and inhumanely evicted from their new informal 
settlement, with their possessions burned and homes destroyed. ISS In 
Grootboom, national, provincial, and local government bodies were 
challenging an order from the Cape High Court, 156 which required the 
"appropriate government organ" to provide shelter for the plaintiff 
children and their parents until the parents could themselves provide 
shelter for their children. 157 
The Constitutional Court conducted a very close reading of 
the constitutional text and analyzed the social context of its drafting. 
It recognized that housing was "a constitutional issue of fundamental 
importance to the development of South Africa's new constitutional 
order."158 Yet, despite enormous efforts and notwithstanding 
significant advancements in the decade following the end of 
apartheid, adequate housing has remained unavailable to many 
South Mricans. 159 The Court first identified the state's negative 
obligation, "to desist from preventing or impairing the right of access 
to adequate housing.,,16o In discussing the positive obligations, the 
154. Id. §28. 
155. Grootboom, supra note 9, paras. 7-11. 
156. In the South African judicial system, High Courts are courts of first 
instance. Although direct application to the Constitutional Court is allowed in the 
Constitution, most cases begin in the High Courts and are reviewed by the 
Supreme Court of Appeals prior to reaching the Constitutional Court. 
157. The High Court had held that the relevant government bodies had 
met their constitutional duty under Section 26 (housing) but had failed to meet 
their duty under Section 28 (minimum services for children). The High Court 
held that the "spirit" of Section 28 required that the order "should take account of 
the need of the child to be accompanied by his or her parent" and thus a parent 
was to accompany the child in the shelter provided. Grootboom, supra note 9, 
paras. 14-16. 
158. Id. para. 2. 
159. Toward 10 Years of Freedom, supra note 28, at 1. 
160. Grootboom, supra note 9, para. 34. 
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Court focused on three aspects of Section 26: it calls for legislative 
and other measures, it recognizes the limitations of available 
resources, and it permits progressive realization. The Court 
essentially conflates these three elements into a reasonableness 
analysis: "[T]he real question in terms of our Constitution is whether 
the measures taken by the state to realise the right afforded by 
[Section] 26 are reasonable.,,161 The Court requires a broad policy 
with particular attention paid to those who are most vulnerable and 
implementation that includes "all reasonable steps necessary to 
initiate and sustain,,162 the program. 
Ai3 described in Grootboom, reasonableness requires state 
authorities (at all levels) to "devise, fund, implement, and supervise" 
measures related to the right of access to housing. 163 The Court 
acknowledged that "a wide range of possible measures could be 
adopted by the State . . . [that] would meet the requirement 
of reasonableness."l64 Nevertheless, while praising much about the 
current housing policies of the government, the Court held that the 
current system unreasonably neglected to consider and address those 
in most dire need. The current program "fell short of constitutional 
compliance" because it failed to "devise and implement within its 
available resources a comprehensive and coordinated programme 
progressively to realise the right of access to adequate housing.,,165 
The Court issued a declaratory order requiring the state to remedy 
this failing and assigned the Human Rights Commission, an 
independent national body, to monitor and report on the status of the 
changes. Referencing a new housing plan proposed during the 
appeals process, the Court indicated that it, or a similar plan of the 
government's choosing, should be implemented "to provide relief for 
people who have no access to land, no roof over their heads, and who 
are living in intolerable conditions or crisis situations."166 
The Court's Grootboom opmIOn couples its specific 
application of the Constitution's social rights provisions with an 
analytical and abstract discussion of the adjudication of socio-
161. Id. para. 33. 
162. Id. paras. 36, 67. 
163. Id. para. 96. 
164. Id. para. 4l. 
165. Id. para. 99. 
166. Id. para. 99. 
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economic rights. The Court dispensed with the justiciability question 
early in its opinion: "The question is therefore not whether socio-
economic rights are justiciable under our Constitution, but how to 
enforce them in a given case."16? Determining the appropriate means 
of enforcement following Grootboom involves a case-by-case 
assessment. The Court looks at the constitutional provisions 
themselves, examines the context of the right-the "textual setting" 
within the Constitution as well as the "social and historical 
context"-and then applies what is learned to the specific 
circumstances of the case. 168 No order was issued to directly address 
the situation of the plaintiffs. Rather summarily, the Court states 
that neither of the rights in question "entitles the respondents to 
claim shelter or housing immediately upon demand."169 
By choosing this path, the Court unexpectedly rejects the 
enforcement of social rights through "minimum core" analysis. 
Minimum core analysis, used by the United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN Committee), in its non-
binding general comments and concluding observations on nation 
reports under the ICESCR, attempts to "ensure the satisfaction of, at 
the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights"I?O by 
state parties to the ICESCR. The minimum core for a particular right 
is gleaned by the UN Committee after years of extensive review of 
country reports submitted by state signatories. Every effort must be 
made by the state to satisfy the identified minimum core obligation. 
Therefore, it defines a "floor" of socio-economic conditions. While the 
Court rejects this procedure as unavailable to it because it lacks the 
extensive information resources of the UN Committee, it agrees with 
one aspect of the UN Committee's inquiry: the necessity for a 
determination ''having regard to the needs of the most vulnerable 
group that is entitled to protection of the right in question."I?1 
While Grootboom is undoubtedly a victory for those favoring 
robust enforcement of socio-economic rights, the limits of that 
167. Id. para. 20. 
168. Id. para. 22. 
169. Id.paras.68,95. 
170. U.N. Off. of the High Comm'r for Hum. Rts. [UNHCHR), Comm. on 
Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights [CESR), General Comment 3: The Nature of 
States Parties Obligations, § 10, U.N. Doc. E/1991123 (Dec. 14, 1990). 
171. Grootboom, supra note 9, para. 31. 
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enforcement remain unclear. The Court was certainly aware of the 
import of its judgment and its inevitable impact upon future socio-
economic rights jurisprudence. The result was a "cautiously crafted 
opinion" that could represent the furthest extent of judicial 
enforceability or a tentative step toward a much more expansive 
jurisprudence.172 How far will the Court go in its enforcement of 
socio-economic rights? Subsequent cases have demonstrated the 
Court's willingness to go further, but have not yet delineated the 
boundaries of the Court's jurisprudence. 
4. Treatment Action Campaign 
In 2002, a group of non-governmental organizations, led by 
the advocacy group Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), challenged 
the government's policies related to the prevention of mother-to-child 
HIV transmission.173 A single dosage of the drug Nevirapine was 
known to dramatically decrease the likelihood that an HIV-positive 
mother would transmit the virus to her child during childbirth. The 
drug manufacturer had agreed to provide the drug to the government 
for free for a period of five years. The government had devised a 
program for distribution at a limited number of pilot sites (two in 
each of South Mrica's eleven provinces) but state doctors outside 
such sites were prohibited from administering the drug, even though 
it was already tested and approved for use in South Mrica and other 
jurisdictions. Only ten percent of the estimated 70,000 annual 
affected births were covered by the approved sites. The government's 
stated plan was to conduct a multi-year study prior to development of 
a national program. 174 
The TAC claimed that the program violated the state's 
constitutional obligation to "respect, protect, promote and fulfill the 
rights in the Bill of Rights,"175 especially as such duty applied to the 
right of access to health care services for pregnant woman and 
172. Geoff Budlender & Kgomosoane Mathipe, Community Law Centre, 
Summary of Key Themes of the Colloquium, Realising Socio-Economic Rights in 
South Africa: Progress and Challenges (2002), 
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.zaiProjects/Socio-Economic-Rights/ 
conferences/summary _oCkey _themes_colloquium. pdf. 
173. TAG, supra note 10. 
174. Id.paras. 10-12, 19,62. 
175. S. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, § 7. 
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children.176 The TAC asked the Court to lift the prohibition on 
distribution of Nevirapine outside the pilot program and to issue an 
order requiring the government to immediately produce a more 
expansive national program for the prevention of such transmission. 
In its most far-reaching judgment to date, the Court granted both 
requests. 177 
In a unanimous opinion, the Court referenced a great deal of 
information "from a variety of specialised perspectives, ranging from 
paediatrics, pharmacology and epidemiology to public health 
administration, economics and statistics."178 The Court then applied 
the reasonableness test from Grootboom. 179 It held that the 
government's goals did not justify the heavy impact the program had 
on the ninety percent of poor pregnant women and their children for 
whom the treatment was functionally prohibited. The program's 
inflexibility and its failure to account for the needs of a particularly 
vulnerable group made it unreasonable: 
[The] Government policy was an inflexible one that denied 
mothers and their newborn children . . . [a] potentially 
lifesaving drug .... [I]t could have been administered 
within the available resources of the State without any 
known harm to mother or child .... [T]he policy of 
government . . . constitutes a breach of the State's 
obligations under [Section] 27(2) read with [Section] 
27( l)(a) of the Constitution. 180 
176. [d. §§ 27 and 28: 
27 Health care, food, water and social security 
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to-
(a) health care services, including reproductive health 
care; ... 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of each of these rights ... 
28 Children 
(1) Every child has the right ... 
(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services 
and social services. 
177. TAC, supra note 10, para. 135. 
178. [d. para. 6. 
179. Grootboom, supra note 9, paras. 42-44. 
180. TAC, supra note 10, para. 80. 
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Additionally, the government's research goals did not justify an 
indefinite postponement of development of a comprehensive national 
program. 181 The Court held that the government was 
"constitutionally obliged . . . to plan and implement an effective, 
comprehensive and progressive programme for the prevention of 
mother-to-child transmission of HIV throughout the country.,,182 The 
Court issued a number of mandatory orders. The government was 
required to remove the prohibitions on distribution of Nevirapine 
"without delay" and to facilitate its availability at sites outside the 
pilot sites so that the drug could be administered where medically 
indicated. The government was also required, as part of an 
immediate national program, to extend testing and counseling 
facilities related to mother-to-child transmission throughout the 
public health sector.183 
With its extensive remedy, the TAC judgment either draws 
closest to the nightmare scenario of judicial overreaching dreaded by 
opponents of justiciability or approaches the judicial realization of 
the constitutional text's transformative social values as favored by 
supporters. But even this ruling evidenced some judicial restraint. 
First, the Court rejected a request for ongoing judicial supervision of 
the government's HIV programs, despite a request for such a 
supervisory order from the complainants. 184 More notably, despite its 
extensive orders related to Nevirapine, the Court did not carry 
forward the lower court's order for the state to provide infant formula 
181. Id. para. 122. 
182. Id. para. 5. 
183. Id. para. 135: 
Government is ordered without delay to: 
(a) Remove the restrictions that prevent Nevirapine 
from being made available ... at public hospitals and 
clinics that are not research and training sites. 
(b) Permit and facilitate the use of Nevirapine ... at 
hospitals and clinics when ... medically indicated, 
which shall if necessary include that the mother 
concerned has been appropriately tested and 
counselled. 
(c) Make provision if necessary for counsellors based 
at public hospitals and clinics other than the research 
and training sites .... 
184. But lower courts in South Africa have not been as hesitant to issue 
supervisory orders. See Liebenberg, supra note 72, § 33.12. 
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to poor mothers-which was, along with client counseling, the most 
expensive element of the lower court's order. 185 Instead, the Court 
found that there was not "sufficient evidence to justify an order that 
formula feed must be made available by the government on request 
and without charge in every case."186 The clear implication of this 
finding, however, is that such an order is not beyond the scope of the 
Court's authority; the Court was merely unable to obtain the 
necessary factual basis to make such an order in the context of this 
case. 187 
5. Other Social Rights Cases Before the Court 
The previously discussed substantive cases-Soobramoney, 
Grootboom, and TAC-represent the preponderance of the Court's 
socio-economic rights jurisprudence to date. Nevertheless, there are 
additional cases related to social rights that also contribute to the 
development of the Court's jurisprudence. Each of these other cases 
required the Court to analyze social rights outside the fairly uniform 
model presented by the three central cases. 188 Two of these cases are 
examined below. In Jaftha v Schoeman, the Court focused on 
enforcement of the negative rather than positive element of a social 
right,189 and in Khosa v Minister of Social Development the Court 
evaluated the merits of a social rights claim in connection with other 
constitutional rights. 190 
In Jaftha, the appellants were rendered homeless when their 
residences were sold to recover purchase money and housing debt 
fines owed to another private party.191 They claimed a violation of the 
negative aspects of the right to housing in Section 26. The positive 
aspect of the right, that the state "must take reasonable legislative 
185. TAC, supra note 10, para. 48. 
186. [d. para. 128. 
187. [d. ("Whether it is desirable to use this substitute rather than 
breastfeeding raises complex issues, particularly when the mother concerned may 
not have easy access to clean water or the ability to adopt a bottle-feeding 
regimen because of her personal circumstances."). 
188. See SERP's Case Reviews, supra note 5 (identifying and summarizing 
other socio-economic rights cases). 
189. Jaftha v Schoeman and Others 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
190. Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 
(CC) (S. Afr.). 
191. Jaftha 2005 (2) SA 140, paras. 3-5. 
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and other measures . . . to achieve . . . realization of' the right to 
housing, was not relevant because the appellants already had homes 
prior to their forced sale. 192 As a consequence, this meant that the 
internal limitations clause was also irrelevant to the case, because 
the "within available resources" and "progressive realization" 
qualifications apply only to the government's affirmative duties to 
advance the right. 193 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Mokgoro affirmed the 
existence of the negative component to social rights and held: 
It is not necessary in this case to delineate all the 
circumstances in which a measure will constitute a 
violation of the negative obligations imposed by the 
Constitution. However, . . . I conclude that, at the very 
least, any measure which permits a person to be deprived of 
existing access to adequate housing limits the rights 
protected in section 26(1).194 
Although the internal limitations clause did not apply, the Court 
examined a limitation on the negative aspect of a social right under 
the general limitations clause, the standard for assessing limitations 
on a civil or political right. 195 The Court concluded that the lack of 
judicial oversight for the forced sale procedure made the action an 
unconstitutional violation of Section 26. 196 
In Khosa, the appellants challenged government denial of 
social welfare grants to otherwise qualified children and elderly 
persons because they were permanent residents of South Africa 
rather than citizens.197 The Court examined the case under Section 
27's right to social security: "Everyone has the right to have access to 
. . . social security, including, if they are unable to support 
themselves and their dependants, appropriate social assistance. "198 
Because the Court held that use of the word "everyone" in the text of 
Section 27 differentiated it from provisions granting rights to 
"citizens," the restrictions on social security in Khosa were examined 
192. See id. paras. 31-33. 
193. [d. 
194. [d. para. 34. 
195. [d. 
196. [d. paras. 52-55. 
197. Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 
(CC) (S. Afr.). 
198. S. Afr. Const. 1996, § 27. 
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in conjunction with the rights to equality, life, and dignity for 
everyone. 199 
In reviewing the reasonableness of the limitation, the Court 
highlighted two issues: (1) that financially-based limitations were 
permitted because of the Section 27(2) internal limitation clause and 
(2) that other constitutional rights were clearly implicated in the 
government's plan. While acknowledging that the State "may be able 
to justify not paying benefits to everyone," the majority required that 
once a benefits program was initiated, "the criteria upon which they 
choose to limit the payment of those benefits (in this case citizenship) 
must be consistent with the Bill of Rights as a whole. "200 Mter 
considerable analysis of the purpose and effect of the right to social 
security,201 the validity of differentiation based on citizenship,202 and 
the actual financial claims made by the government,203 the Court 
determined that the restriction was unreasonable and violated the 
rights to both equality and social security. As a result, non-citizen 
permanent residents are now eligible for grants where similarly-
situated citizens would also receive them.204 
It is still too early to tell if the growing number of cases 
involving social rights, in addition to traditional civil and political 
rights or enforcement of the negative aspect of social rights, will 
impact the Court's jurisprudence significantly.20s Such adjudication, 
however, certainly complements the more direct advancement of 
social welfare in the primary cases discussed above and expands the 
reach ofthe Court's social rights jurisprudence. 
199. Khosa 2004 (6) SA 505, paras. 40-4l. 
200. Id. para. 44. 
201. Id. paras. 50-52. 
202. Id. paras. 53-57. 
203. Id. paras. 58-62. 
204. Id. para. 98 (reading in the words "or permanent resident" following 
"citizens" in the relevant parts of the legislation). 
205. See, e.g., President of the Republic of S. Afr. v Modderklip Boerdery 
(Pty) Ltd. 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) (S. Afr.) (holding that a private landowner was owed 
compensation for occupation of his land once the government failed to enforce a 
legal eviction against 40,000 squatters; squatters permitted to remain until 
alternative sites made available); see also Minister of Pub. Works and Others v 
Kyalami Ridge Envtl. Assn. and Others 2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC) (S. Afr.) (rejecting 
procedural and property right challenges to the establishment of emergency 
housing site on government land). 
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C. An Affirmative Socio-Economic Jurisprudence 
The South African Constitutional Court's burgeoning 
jurisprudence of socio-economic rights is presented in the cases 
discussed above. The Court addresses the justiciability question 
directly and delineates its method for addressing both the negative 
and positive elements of the express social rights into the South 
African Constitution. Synthesizing what the judgments evidence 
about the Court's social rights jurisprudence reveals much about how 
the Court will adjudicate and enforce socio-economic rights in future 
cases. 
1. Justiciability 
The question of justiciability is a settled point of law. As was 
said in Grootboom, "[socio-economic rights] are rights, and the 
Constitution obliges the State to give effect to them. This is an 
obligation that the Courts can, and in appropriate circumstances, 
must enforce.,,206 Ultimately, this issue was easy for the Court to 
resolve because social rights are enumerated in the text of the 
Constitution and because the Court had addressed the initial 
objections to the justiciability of such rights directly in the 
Certification opinion. 
2. Negative Enforcement 
As a consequence of the "easy" justiciability determination, 
the heft of the Court's innovative jurisprudence addresses the "how" 
of adjudication-enforcement-rather than the "if'-justiciability. 
The Court views each right as having negative and positive 
aspects.207 However, to date, only one case has formally identified a 
violation of the negative aspects of the right, what the Grootboom 
case called "a negative obligation placed upon the State and all other 
entities and persons to desist from preventing or impairing the 
right .... "208 
206. Grootboom, supra note 9, para. 94. 
207. In re: Certification of the South African Constitution, supra note 7, 
para. 78; Grootboom, supra note 9, paras. 34-38; TAC, supra note 10, para. 46. 
208. Grootboom, supra note 9, para. 34. 
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Judicial review of the negative elements of social rights is not 
subject to the internal limitations clause, although it is subject to 
review against the Constitution's general limitations clause?09 This 
is because the "progressive realization" clause and the "within 
available resources" clause arise from and qualify the positive 
obligation to "take reasonable legislative and other measures.'>2IO The 
Court's analysis of the negative aspect is a more direct application of 
traditional South Mrican rights analysis and will often be evaluated 
in conjunction with a violation of the right to equality or dignity.2lI 
3. Positive Enforcement 
The positive aspects of a right are also enforceable, but they 
give rise to complications that make them more difficult to enforce 
judicially. Also, it is the positive aspects of social rights that give rise 
to most of the traditional justiciability concerns. The most important 
of these considerations is the connection between the obligation of 
the state and the state's available resources. In the Soobramoney 
case, the dissent said that the "rights themselves are limited by 
reason of a lack of resources."212 However, the state may not merely 
assert a lack of available funding as a justification for doing nothing 
to advance a social right. The burden of evidencing resource 
limitations is borne by the state and the Court will actively analyze 
the state's proffered claims. Moreover, the "progressive realization" 
formulation means that the state's obligation is dynamic: it should 
increase over time. Hence, the Court maintains the option to revisit 
previously reviewed but static government programs. 
4. Reasonableness 
A lack of an affirmative response, or an allegedly inadequate 
response, to the positive obligation imposed on the government by 
the Constitution's social rights provisions will result in review by the 
Constitutional Court. The "obligations imposed on the state ... are 
209. Jaftha v Schoeman and Others 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) paras. 31-33 (S. 
Afr.). 
210. S. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, §§ 26(2), 27(2), and 29(1)(b). 
211. See, e.g., Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) 
SA 505 (CC) paras. 109, 112-113 (S. Afr.). 
212. Soobramoney, supra note 1, para. 11 (Ngcobo, J., dissenting). 
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dependent upon the resources available for such purposes,"213 but the 
fulfillment of such obligations will be examined with a 
reasonableness inquiry. For this reason, the heft of any adjudication 
of socio-economic rights is the assessment of the reasonableness of 
the government action or inaction when the right is viewed in 
context. The reasonableness standard, which generally encompasses 
the internal limitations clause, will guide the Courts's analysis and 
"must be determined on the facts of each case."214 Some components 
of the reasonableness review are evident in the caselaw: is the 
legislative or other government action comprehensive and well-
coordinated; was there appropriate division of political and expert 
authority in its formulation; can it facilitate realization of the right 
in question; is it balanced and flexible to the extent necessary; and 
does it include all significant segments of society and take into 
account those persons in the most dire need? In essence, the Court 
requires a broad policy-based program with particular attention paid 
to those who are most vulnerable and implementation that includes 
"all reasonable steps necessary to initiate and sustain" a successful 
program to advance the social right.215 
5. Remedies 
The South African Constitutional Court has broad remedial 
powers to advance the interests of justice in its rulings. Hence, the 
remedy chosen and the manner in which the remedy is implemented 
are particularly important issues. Where the Court enforces a 
positive state obligation it may make use of declaratory, supervisory, 
or mandatory orders. The Constitutional Court has not yet made use 
of supervisory orders, which would provide for ongoing monitoring by 
the Court, even where not requested to do so. Furthermore, to date, 
all of its orders relate to the state's programs rather than to an 
individual's request for relief. Even when enforcing the negative 
aspect of the right, no individual relief has yet been granted in a 
socio-economic rights case. Moreover, details of remedial programs 
are, wherever possible, left to the appropriate governmental body to 
determine. 
213. [d. 
214. Grootboom, supra note 9, para. 92. 
215. [d. para. 67. 
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D. The Incorporation of Justiciability Concerns 
The Court's assessment and enforcement of social rights is a 
first in the field of constitutional jurisprudence. It has created a 
viable, comprehensive system of affirmative socio-economic rights 
adjudication. But analysis of the Court's judgments also evidences a 
series of limitations that do not arise from the Constitution itself and 
are not evident in the Court's political rights jurisprudence. These 
limits are carefully aligned with certain concerns of those who argue 
that social rights are non-justiciable. The Court that passed so 
casually over the critique of justiciability in its Certification opinion 
has created a jurisprudence that internalizes this critique through 
self-imposed limitations. But not all of the traditional critiques of the 
justiciability of socio-economic rights were legitimate concerns of the 
Court's first generation of justices as they formulated their 
affirmative social rights jurisprudence. 216 The three predominant, 
extant challenges to justiciability (after accounting for South Mrica's 
particular history and constitution) are the plaintiff problem, the 
information problem, and the remedy problem. 
1. Plaintiff Problem 
The Court accommodates the plaintiff problem by focusing its 
adjudication on the characteristics of the government program rather 
than on the circumstances of the plaintiff. By focusing on the 
attributes of the program-its flexibility, impartiality, basis in 
justifiable policy or verifiable information, etc.-the evidence before 
the Court is not limited to a snapshot of conditions or the treatment 
of one individual. This focus addresses the concern that adjudication 
might apply only to one narrow population within an affected 
community. For example, adjudication that resulted in meeting the 
needs of the plaintiff Irene Grootboqm only (or even of her and her 
900 co-plaintiffs only) would still fail to address the larger issue of 
the government's obligations related to the right of access to housing. 
The Court's approach helps to avoid piecemeal and serial 
litigation regarding similar circumstances and also allows the Court 
to request improvement of government programs even if there is no 
appropriate individual remedy. Moreover, applying a flexible 
216. See discussion supra Part III. 
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reasonableness standard to government programs allows more 
judicial discretion to broadly investigate the failings of the program, 
even if particular faults are not directly related to the plaintiff. 
Focusing on the government program rather than on the 
aggrieved party, however, raises the possibility that the Court will 
not provide justice to the individual before it. In the absence of 
individual remedies, the plaintiff must wait for reform of the 
government program before her needs are met, i.e., before her 
constitutional rights are realized. This is a troubling result of the 
jurisprudence in light of the South Mrican Constitutional 
dispensation, which seeks to foster a culture of human rights. The 
best the Court has been able to do in this regard is to require that the 
government program address those in direst need. Arguably, the 
declaration of unconstitutionality in the housing program in 
Grootboom, because it failed to take into account those "who are 
living in intolerable conditions or crisis situations," demonstrates 
that the Court is advancing the social justice concerns of the 
Constitution in its jurisprudence.217 But this type of enforcement still 
causes problems for plaintiffs. Although its requirement to address 
the neediest of South Mricans increases the chance of advancing 
social transformation to aid all persons similarly situated to the 
plaintiff, the Court's accommodation of justiciability concerns-
especially the plaintiff problem-has restricted its capacity to 
address the individual needs of the plaintiffs before it in court. 
2. Information Problem 
Occasionally, the Court seems acutely aware of justiciability 
critiques like the information problem. In TAC, it stated: "It should 
be borne in mind that in dealing with [social rights] matters the 
Courts are not institutionally equipped to make the wide-ranging 
factual and political enquiries necessary . . . ."218 Despite this, the 
information problem is not as significant for the South African 
Constitutional Court as it might be for other courts. The Court has 
interpreted its control over its own procedures to permit it to request 
217. Grootboom, supra note 9, para. 99; see also TAG, supra note 10, paras. 
79-80 (presenting another example by highlighting the inadequacies of the 
previous program for Nevirapine distribution in that it impacted most heavily 
poor women and children). 
218. TAG, supra note 10, para. 37. 
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additional information from one or both parties, to order counsel to 
prepare written arguments on issues of interest to the justices (but 
not initially covered in the pleadings), and to make submissions 
related to factual disputes or relevant policy decisions.219 
Nevertheless, only a portion of the information problem is 
remedied by broad authority to request additional information. Even 
where a court has substantial authority to require submissions, there 
are inevitably situations in which the necessary information is 
unavailable, indeterminate, or otherwise unhelpful. In such 
circumstances, the Court's discretion must control whether or not it 
is capable of making a sufficiently informed decision. As the Court 
said in Khosa, "[i]t would not, however, have been in the public 
interest in this case for this Court to have proceeded with the 
hearing without the information necessary for a proper 
determination of the case . . . .'>220 For critics of social rights 
adjudication whose primary concerns are legitimacy-based, this is an 
additional source of consternation. But such critiques remain ill-
suited to the South African situation. Certainly a Court entrusted 
with determination of the constitutionality of the Constitution itself 
(as enforcer of the negotiated agreement memorialized in the Interim 
Constitution) can be expected to appropriately determine whether it 
has sufficient information to adjudicate a particular issue that is 
properly before it. Indeed, in at least one circumstance the Court has 
drawn fairly narrow distinctions between issues for which the 
amount and quality of information is problematic and for which it is 
sufficient, i.e., its decision that sufficient studies did not yet exist 
regarding the formula feeding element of the lower court's order in 
the TAC case.221 
In addition to using its broad procedural authority to gather 
information or, where that is inadequate, its discretion to determine 
that it lacks the necessary information, the Court has addressed this 
justiciability challenge by placing the burden of proof upon the 
219. A review of the (non-substantive) orders of the Constitutional Court 
demonstrates the breadth of Constitutional Court capacity of this kind. 
220. Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 
(CC) para. 23 (S. Afr.). 
221. See discussion supra Part IV.B.4; accord Khosa and Others v Minister 
of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) para. 23-25 (S. AfrJ ("This Court 
required further information to enable it to discharge its constitutional duty, and 
it was in the interests of justice that such information be placed before it."). 
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government when it claims a lack of available resources-one of the 
most challenging factual inquiries.222 Placing the burden on the 
government addresses the information problem by requiring the 
state, the only party with that particular (and critical) information, 
to present it to the Court in order to justify its arguments. 
3. Remedy Problem 
Although a host of issues are usually highlighted by 
opponents of socio-economic rights justiciability, there is little doubt 
that the dominant concern is the impact and potential damage of 
judicial remedies imposed in social rights cases. Any judicial 
determination that intrudes upon a traditional legislative area, 
particularly if it has significant budget implications, highlights the 
remedy problem. In the extreme circumstance, such remedies are 
feared to be capable of bankrupting the State or severely disrupting 
implementation of more politically important or democratically 
popular programs. The secondary concern is that a court-created 
remedy will fail to consider the mechanics of enforcement: 
programmatic details, administrative requirements, and other 
components commonly devised by the legislative and executive 
branches of government. The Court itself has acknowledged the 
problem, saying that courts "are ill-suited to adjudicate upon issues 
where the Court orders could have multiple social and economic 
consequences for the community. The Constitution contemplates 
rather a restrained and focused role for the 
Courts . . . . "223 
At an initial level, the solution to the remedy problem lies 
with the discretion and restraint of the justices of the Constitutional 
Court. The Court's capacity to issue "any order that is just and 
equitable" certainly allows it to promote remedies less than the full 
reach of the Court's broad remedial authority. Consistent with this 
principle, the Court has addressed the remedy problem in at least 
three recognizable ways: by deferring to the legislature where no 
clear violation of a right has occurred, by assuming as little 
traditionally legislative authority as possible regarding remedial 
222. See Liebenberg, supra note 72, § 33.9. 
223. TAC, supra note 10, para. 38. 
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program specifics, and by rejecting any form of unqualified rights 
that might otherwise call for non-discretionary remedies. 
a. Deference to the Legislature 
Wherever it can, the Court affirms-perhaps sometimes 
disingenuously-the deference it shows to the legislative branch in 
line with the separation of powers: "A court considering 
reasonableness will not enquire whether other more desirable or 
favourable measures could have been adopted, or whether public 
money could have been better spent."224 Nevertheless, the Court will 
carefully review the characteristics of allegedly inadequate 
legislative programs. The professed deference is only for programs 
within the court-identified range of reasonableness. Similarly, the 
Court asserts that its remedies intrude as little as possible into other 
political branches' territory. "Such determinations of reasonableness 
may in fact have budgetary implications, but are not in themselves 
directed at rearranging budgets."225 In this way the Court's deference 
lessens, albeit minimally, the remedy problem and "the judicial, 
legislative and executive functions achieve appropriate constitutional 
balance.,,226 
b. Programmatic Design and Practicalities 
For practical reasons and in order to be consistent with "the 
deference that courts should show to [policy] decisions taken by the 
executive,"227 the Court has attempted to formulate remedies that 
guide rather than dictate legislative action. Even in the TAC case, 
where it gave its most far-reaching order, the Court insisted that all 
available constitutionally consistent options be left open to the 
executive.228 Indeed, the Court asserts that a reasonableness inquiry 
is as far as it will go. "The precise contours and context of the 
measures to be adopted" are the responsibility of the legislature and 
executive.229 The Court identifies constitutional failings in a 
224. Grootboom, supra note 9, para. 41. 
225. TAG, supra note 10, para. 38. 
226. [d. 
227. [d. para. 22. 
228. [d. para. 114. 
229. Grootboom, supra note 9, para. 41. 
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challenged government program and orders a reformulation of it in 
accordance with the judgment, but the specific solutions must be 
designed and implemented by the legislature. Hence, the new 
programs are far more likely to be viable, congruent with other 
legislative initiatives, and consistent with civil service best practices. 
c. The Problem with Absolute Rights 
Unqualified or unlimited social rights are the greatest 
concern of those who argue against the justiciability of socio-
economic rights. From a constitutive theory standpoint, inclusion of 
such a right is a radical statement by the drafters that the right 
represents a non-negotiable value and it is to be prioritized over all 
other state concerns (except other enforceable unqualified rights). In 
the South Mrican Constitution, the right to basic education and the 
right of children to basic welfare ("basic nutrition, shelter, basic 
health care services and social services") are not restricted by an 
internal limitation clause as are all other social rights.230 Such rights 
are not subject to progressive realization or the limitations arising 
from inadequate state resources. Of course, unrestricted rights do not 
mean rights without any substantive limits; the scope of the right 
would still be defined by the Court. Rights claims that fall within the 
judicially determined substantive scope of an unqualified right, 
however, must be satisfied by the state. Even if interpreted at a 
minimum, unrestricted rights require de facto prioritization and 
involve the courts in their enforcement despite even valid concerns 
about legitimacy or judicial capacity. In the traditional critique, 
absolute social rights represent a lose-lose scenario for the judiciary. 
Either courts enforce the rights and give them an effective priority 
even against the wishes of the political branches, or the courts 
230. S. Mr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, §§ 28 and 29. Section 28 (1) reads: "Every 
child has the right ... (b) to family care or parental care, or to appropriate 
alternative care when removed from the family environment; (c) to basic 
nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services ... " 
Section 29 (1) reads: "Everyone has the right ... to a basic education, including 
adult basic education .... " 
Such rights are still subject to the Constitution's general limitations clause (§ 
36), but the natural reading of § 36 in light of the text of these two rights would 
preclude limitations based on the grounds specifically excluded from only these 
two social rights. Furthermore, progressive realization and available resources 
are not common limitations upon any other rights in the Bill of Rights. 
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disregard the clear text and intent of the constitution, thereby 
weakening constitutionalism in the state. 
Fear of this no-compromise scenario explains the Court's 
incongruous treatment of the unqualified Section 28 right to basic 
welfare for children in Grootboom.231 If the Court interprets Section 
28 in its textual context, as it requires with all rights, it should hold 
that the internal limitations clauses found in other rights do not 
apply. This presents the remedy problem at it starkest: even 
reasonable limitations on such a right, e.g., legitimate financial 
considerations, would be invalid. Provision for children's basic needs 
must then be met outside the normal democratic process for 
determining the allocation of state resources. This right, and all 
other unqualified constitutional rights, must receive priority in the 
use of state funds until the need is met. Rejecting this notion of 
unlimited pre-commitments, the Court ignores the obvious textual 
differences in order to accommodate remedy problem concerns. 
Not only unqualified textual rights give rise to absolute 
rights. The International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights Committee, the preeminent body for defining and evaluating 
social rights at an international level, assesses state signatory 
compliance with the rights provisions of the ICESCR through the 
analysis of "minimum core obligations." Minimum core obligations, 
as identified by the ICESCR Committee, identify and require a 
minimum acceptable standard for all persons related to each social 
right.232 Minimum core rights analysis yields a low substantive 
threshold, but mandates it; like enumerated, unqualified rights, it 
removes certain expenses from the discretionary review of the 
legislature. 
Reflecting the prevalence of the minimum core approach and 
the Court's obligation to analyze international law, petitioners in 
each South African social rights case have argued that the support 
231. Grootboom, supra note 9. The Court has not yet had a case relying on 
the right to basic education. 
232. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC), Comm. on Econ., Soc. and 
Cultural Rights, General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations, § 
10, U.N. Doc. E/1991123 (Dec. 14, 1990) ("[A] State party in which any significant 
number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary 
health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education 
is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant."). 
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they sought falls within classic minimum core rights analysis.233 The 
Court, however, rejects minimum core analysis, despite the 
predominance of such analysis in the work of the ICESCR 
Committee. Claiming that "even if it were appropriate to [identify a 
minimum core], it could not be done," because of the Court's 
inadequate information resources.234 While a minimum core is 
"possibly ... relevant to reasonableness" it is "not ... a self-standing 
right conferred on everyone."235 The Court's fear is that, with 
minimum core analysis, it would be involved in policy setting and 
resource allocation in all areas for which it found a minimum core 
obligation. By using the reasonableness standard instead of 
minimum core analysis, the Court is able to further evade the 
remedy problem. 
The Court's refusal to acknowledge the unqualified rights for 
children despite the clear text of Section 28 and the history of the 
right, as well as the Court's decision not to employ minimum core 
analysis despite its prevalence in this field and despite a 
constitutional requirement to consider international law when 
interpreting rights, can best be explained as the Court's attempt to 
craft a jurisprudence that avoids the most threatening aspects of the 
remedy problem. Here, as with the plaintiff problem and the 
information problem, the Court navigates a jurisprudence that 
avoids the perceived pitfalls of social rights adjudication. The result 
is an affirmative jurisprudence, the contours of which are best 
explained by incorporation of the relevant justiciability critiques. 
v. CONCLUSION 
It would be a hollow victory if the people had the right every 
five or so years to emerge from their forced-removal hovels . .. to go to 
the [polls], only thereafter to return to their inferior houses, inferior 
education and inferior jobs. 236 
233. See Liebenberg, supra note 72, § 33.5(e) (providing a discussion about 
the Court's rejection of minimum core obligations analysis and a review of the 
critiques ofthat position). 
234. Grootboom, supra note 9, para. 33. 
235. TAC, supra note 10, para. 34. 
236. Albie Sachs, Towards a Bill of Rights in a Democratic South Africa, 6 
S. Afr. J. Hum. Rts. 1, 5 (1980). 
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The South Mrican Constitutional Court's role in the debate 
about socio-economic rights justiciability has been described as heroic 
and revolutionary by one side and as irresponsible and doomed by 
the other. Neither side gets it quite right. The Court's jurisprudence 
is both more radical and less so than many commentators have 
argued. It is less radical, less a departure from the standard concerns 
regarding the justiciability of socio-economic rights, in that the 
jurisprudence incorporates the norms implicit in the theoretical 
critique of such adjudication. And yet, the jurisprudence is also more 
radical because, by demonstrating a viable model of social rights 
adjudication that incorporates the concerns of its detractors in a 
substantive manner, the South Mrican jurisprudence more explicitly 
challenges their broadly held non-justiciability viewpoints. 
This Article presents this dual view of the current South 
Mrican Constitutional Court jurisprudence related to social rights. It 
also provides a framework for understanding future decisions of the 
Court as it either sustains these limitations in an expression of on-
going respect for theoretical justiciability concerns, or it diminishes 
its reliance on such limits as the Court grows more confident in its 
role as enforcer of the fundamentally transformative social values in 
the South African Constitution. Either way, an understanding of the 
Court's practical integration of theoretical justiciability concerns: (1) 
introduces a new means of evaluating social rights decision-making 
by COurtS;237 (2) illustrates a novel, coherent model for future drafters 
of constitutions to address justiciability concerns when incorporating 
enforceable rights; and (3) highlights a new means of comparing 
social rights drafting decisions and jurisprudence across countries 
and historical periods. In the process, it cannot help but honor the 
work of those persons-activists, drafters, justices, and others-who 
237. The South African model may also provide an alternative means for 
enforcing the socio-economic rights in the ICESCR if progress is made on the 
proposed Optional Protocol related to individual complaints. U.N. Econ. & Soc. 
Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Hum. Rts., Report of the open-ended working 
group to consider options regarding the elaboration of an optional protocol to the 
[ICESCR] on its first session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4I2004144 (Mar. 15, 2004); see 
Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability Of Economic, Social, And 
Cultural Rights: Should There Be An International Complaints Mechanism To 
Adjudicate The Rights To Food, Water, Housing, And Health?, 98 Am. J. Int'l L. 
462 (2004). 
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made justiciable social rights a reality in South Africa and In 
international constitutional jurisprudence. 
